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This thesis argues that the removal of the Cold War's
stabilizing effect on Asian-Pacific security has revealed an
escalating level of anxiety and growing mutual mistrust among
the nations of this region, indicating future instability and
possible conflict. The scaling back of military commitments
in the region by the United States, combined with historical
Asian animosities are currently fueling a regional maritime
arms race among China, India, Japan, and the nations of ASEAN.
These nations are preparing to utilize improved naval forces
to play an influential if not leading role in the emerging
regional power structure. Naval development programs of these
nations are examined in detail.
This thesis posits that the United States maintains vital
economic and security interests in this region and therefore
must be actively involved in the formation of a new regional
security structure. The thesis concludes with an examination
of future options for U.S. military presence in Asia.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis contends that the United States has vital
economic and security interests within the Asia-Pacific region
that exist entirely outside of the realm of the Cold War
context. Therefore, the end of the Cold War does not signal
an end to U.S. commitment to this region. On the one hand,
American regional interests take the form of vigorous two-way
trade, growing investment opportunities, as well as a largely
untapped consumer market . On the other hand, the United
States must also be alert to the impact on the regional and
global balance of power of renewed naval rivalries and naval
development in the Asia-Pacific region.
The so-called "peace dividend" being pursued by some U.S.
policy makers takes the form of deep defense cuts with the
intention of reapplying those funds toward the resolution of
pressing, but strictly defined domestic crises. While this
proposal is attractive at first blush, it is decidedly short-
sighted and it would be dangerous to forge ahead with large
scale drawdowns and a sweeping retrenchment of U.S. forces
from overseas. This is especially the case in Asia.
This thesis argues that the countries of Asia are
experiencing serious anxiety over the future security
structure within this largely maritime region. Of greatest
VI
concern is the possibility of a removal or large scale
drawdown of U.S. forces from the region. Adding to those
misgivings is the observable and widespread animosity between
key countries in the region as a result of economic, cultural,
and historical enmity.
In this context this thesis will examine the current naval
modernization programs of: China, India, Japan, and the
nations of ASEAN. These programs are being undertaken so that
these individual nations will possess the military strength to
play a significant role in a newly emerging security
arrangement. The thesis indicates that without a strong U.S.
presence, China, Japan, and even India have designs on the
leadership role within such an arrangement
.
Asian naval modernization programs have been seen by some
observers as simply the normal maturation of military forces
within a region where militaries have traditionally lagged
behind those of the west. This thesis asserts, however, that
these nations are not only engaged in a quantitative buildup
and modernization, but, that they are also shifting the
strategic focus of the utility of those forces toward newly
emerging threats, and with the intention of altering the
regional and global balance of power. In this case, threats
are seen to be emerging in and around the vital sea-lanes of
communication that ring this entire region. The threat, while
not explicitly defined, is clearly the threat of uncertainty
over who will control the future security situation.
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Thus the naval focus of the arms buildups in these nations
can be seen as preparation for undefined, but anticipated
maritime conflict. The maintenance of vital American economic
and political interests in the region demands that the United
States remain engaged militarily in order to protect those
interests from the inevitable harm of protracted conflict. A
continuation of U.S. military presence in the region does not
necessitate the maintenance of Cold War level forces, and the
options and recommendations for a revised presence are
examined in the final chapter.
vm
I. INTRODUCTION: POST-COLD WAR ASIA AND THE REVISION OF
U.S. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES.
There is something both odd and persistent about America's
two centuries of relations with the countries of East
Asia. What seems odd is that Americans, so far removed
from Asians space, time, language, and culture, should
nonetheless thrust repeatedly toward that 'Far West.' Yet
to Asia they persisted in journeying, from the end of the
War of Independence right up to the present-as traders and
missionaries, adventurers and consuls, soldiers, sailors,




The intention of this thesis is to address what may be a
long term challenge to the national security and worldwide
strength of the United States. The 1992 view held by some
policy makers and scholars of a post-Cold War peace dividend
may be simply another way of achieving American international
disengagement and may spell a long-term decline for the United
States, its allies, and their shared interests around the
world.
-
1 James C. Thompson, Peter W. Stanley and John Curtis Perry,
Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia (New
York, N.Y. : Harper Torchbooks , 1981), 1.
: President Clinton proposes some widespread and deep defense
cuts with the purpose of rechanneling those saved funds toward
bolstering U.S. economic strength and thereby becoming economically
stronger around the world. With drastic cuts in military
commitments in Europe being witnessed, it would be imprudent to
assume that Asia would not see similar drawdowns in the future.
As the above quotation intimates, the United States has
had a long relationship with East Asia and Asia in general.
It would be foolish to think that this relationship would in
any way decline or carry less importance in the future. Quite
clearly the relationship was extant in a different form long
before the Cold War. It is critical for the United States to
manage the imminent changes in this relationship from a
position of strength, not weakness (perceived or otherwise)
.
In November 1992, the U.S. Department of Defense delivered
to Congress its report titled "A Strategic Framework for the
Asian Pacific Rim. " This report assessed Asian security
considerations in light of recent global developments and the
concurrent effect those developments might have on future U.S.
military commitments in the region. Notably, the report had
a significant emphasis on the dynamic economic situation in
Asia and the U.S. involvement therein:
Our economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region since World War II has been a major factor in the
region's emergence as one of the engines of global growth.
Our two-way trade across the Pacific last year exceeded
$310 billion - nearly one-third larger than our trade with
Europe. The US exports more to Indonesia than to Eastern
Europe; more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy. US
exports to East Asia and the Pacific were $130 billion -
that translates into roughly 2.6 million American jobs
dependent on our trade with the region. Moreover, US
firms have more than $62 billion invested in Asia. 3
U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the
Asian Pacific Rim , Washington D.C., November 1992, 2.
It is clear from this quotation, that the DOD senses a
fundamental shift in the evaluation not only of American
military commitments, but also of the essential U.S. national
interests being affirmed around Asia. This reassessment is
taking place not so much on the international stage as it is,
most notably, inside the United States itself. Adding to the
magnitude of this scrutiny, this reappraisal is being
conducted within the context of a particularly difficult
economic period for the United States, coterminous with a
renewed demand for increased attention and funding being
directed toward the alleviation of serious domestic problems.
It is this desire on the part of the American people at
large for the visible benefits of the "peace dividend" that
tends to fuel a renewed skepticism for any U.S. policy that
seems to not immediately benefit the taxpayers of the United
States. This attitude can be observed in terms of foreign
aid, military assistance programs and, of course, the defense
budget. United States history has shown the tendency on the
part of Americans to turn their focus inward in times of
economic hardship. These hardships, combined with the end of
the Cold War, fuel the current public preference toward
solving domestic vice foreign problems.
The Defense Department strategists seek to convey that
post-Cold War Asia has some unique and peculiar interests to
the United States outside of the Cold War context. In fact
those interests have been present throughout the duration of
the Cold War and have outlasted that conflict to now assume
center stage in terms of American perceptions of national
interests around the region. These interests take the form of
lucrative economic markets and friendly political ties to the
region that stretch far back into our past.
During the Cold War the United States carefully developed
a series of bilateral and multilateral relationships around
the Asian-Pacific region that were pursued in the interest of
laying the groundwork for Asian goodwill toward and economic
cooperation with the U.S. Extensive foreign aid to Japan,
South Korea and indeed around much of Asia, was intended to
influence the decision makers within these countries to either
side with the United States during the Cold War or at least
remain visibly outside of that conflict.
The clear approval and promotion by the United States of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was an
instance of this type of friendship building. The example of
post-World War II Japan provides the best illustration of the
United States placing the goals and principles of containment
above what could otherwise be perceived as the regional
economic and strategic self interests of the United States.
While U.S. ties to Asia span many generations, the
relationship underwent a fundamental shift in the context
of the Cold War, assuming a global significance. In the
years since 1941, however, massive American military
involvement was to be followed by diverse efforts at
political tutelage, extensive cultural exchange and a
level of economic and financial intercourse that was
eventually to make the Pacific-Asian region more critical
to the American economy than Europe. 4
Indeed, the United States began to view all of Asia
through a similar prism. It could be said that the beginning
of the Korean War in June of 1950 marked a pivotal watershed
for U.S. policy in the Pacific. It is critical to see the
Korean War as affecting more than just U.S. strategic and
military interests within Asia. It was in fact the first
'Cold War war .
'
Given the very nature of the region and its dependence on
raw materials and maritime trade, the Korean War drove home to
the United States the fact that U.S. economic policies had to
be modified in order to mesh with and complement a new set of
strategic goals that viewed the perimeter of Asia (Korea,
Indochina, South Asia) as the holding line beyond which
Communism must not be allowed to spread. While Korea was
initially omitted, it was nonetheless Dean Acheson's so called
"perimeter strategy" of containment delivered in January of
1950 that is seen as the defining moment in terms of setting
the tone for the Cold War in Asia."' Additionally, it is the
close melding of American economic and military strategy that
4 Robert A Scalapino, "The United States and Asia: Future
Prospects," Foreign Affairs 70, No. 5 (Winter 1991/92): 19.
c
' John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the
History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987),
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would serve to inform U.S. foreign policy not only in Asia,
but around the world throughout the duration of the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War clearly has vindicated the
overarching goals of U.S. foreign policy since 1945, thereby
hopefully witnessing an end to the threat of nuclear war.
What remains after the Cold War seems to be a period of
international confusion and apprehension toward the shape of
the future international power structure (s) . A degree of
global befuddlement with what the future may hold has
materialized, and this situation seems to be most acute in
regions that were more peripherally involved in the East-West
struggle, such as the Asia-Pacific region. These countries
are now forced to fundamentally reassess their individual
security considerations apart and independently from the
defining conflict that had informed those concerns for almost
fifty years
.
In terms of U.S. interests in Asia, it must be
acknowledged that the economic challenges America faces there
are largely of U.S. making, or at least support. Japan is
held up as the most obvious example of this policy, and again
it was the start of the Korean War which prompted the United
States to begin to treat Japan more as a bulwark against
communism than as a vanquished enemy. It was indeed during
this period when Japan began to witness the first signs of
spectacular economic success, enjoying a 9% growth in its
overall economy during the Korean War, largely as a result of
the influx of $4 billion from the United States spent on war
supplies and recreation facilities." Contrary to being bitter
about the negative economic results which American goodwill
has wrought after forty-five years of containment, the United
States must shift gears and start to deal with the world, and
Asia specifically, from a position of economic parity and
cooperation
.
Some commentators have recently voiced the belief that the
continued affirmation of U.S. strategic and economic interests
in the region through American military presence,
. . .smacks of the colonial era and the 'white man's burden'
mentality. It reflects a lingering self-image of the
United States as a world policeman. 7
Contrary to this concern, it should be recognized that
U.S. regional interests have not diminished in the least, but
rather have entered a new phase. Far from neo-colonialism, an
era of cooperation, coalition building, and economic
liberalization may be taking shape in Asia.
The United States ha,s sacrificed much to win the Cold War,
and this sacrifice can clearly be observed in Asia. It is
important to note that the United States was well aware that
economic sacrifices were being made in the interest of winning
D Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey (Boulder,
Co.: Westview Press, 1986), 364.
Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz, jr., "Pacific
Agenda: Defense or Economics?," Foreign Policy 79 (Summer 1990):
68.
the Cold War. While the considerable scope of Asian economic
success was not anticipated, it would be a mistake to accuse
U.S. policy makers of carelessly sacrificing American economic
competitiveness without a thought to the long term effects of
such a policy. In American eyes, the containment of
Communism, the promotion of democratic ideals, and the end of
the threat of nuclear war were seen as critical priorities to
be pursued at almost any price.
The past forty-five years have seen American economic
policies toward Asia slighted and literally driven by military
and strategic exigencies. The future may witness the precise
reversal of this relationship. U.S. strength in the future is
clearly dependent on its ability to compete in the
international economic market, largely separate from its
global military strength.
As this thesis contends, in Asia, access to sea-lanes and
vital export markets requires a strong naval presence to
ensure those interests are maintained. It is not a question
of the United States choosing between economic and military
priorities; in the post-Cold War period, American military
presence in Asia is an essential lever for attaining U.S.
economic goals. The new paradigm of international power
politics that is emerging may require less emphasis being
placed on strategic deterrence and nuclear weapons and more on
worldwide economic strength, but that economic strength will
never mature or flourish without the maintenance of a military
8
capability adequate to protect the interests providing that
economic potential.
One hears quite often in the United States today:
"Where's the threat?"
. . .the real threat we now face is the threat of the
unknown, the uncertain. The threat is instability and
being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one
predicted or expected. 3
The obscure "threat of the unknown," as President Bush's
"National Security Strategy" has put it, does not sit
particularly well with Congress or the American people. That
does not make the uncertainty any less alarming, and it is the
job of military leaders and policy makers to explain the
dangers inherent in that uncertainty to the American people.
In Asia it would clearly not seem wise to drawdown U.S.
forces to skeletal size simply because Washington policymakers
are unable to specifically name a near-term threat to U.S.
regional interests. As the United States has military and
economic interests in the region, protection of those
interests should be a given regardless of the immediately
apparent threat level.
As importantly, a significant U.S. drawdown would quite
likely precipitate the very threat which the United States
seems to so often require before such a threat is both taken
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the
United States , Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
January 1992, 4.
seriously and decisively dealt with. In this case a regional
arms race possibly leading to regional conflict would quite
clearly effect the entire world, as well as effect U.S.
interests and might be prudently prevented with some careful
foresight and mid to long-term planning.
It only requires a cursory glance at the headlines to
witness the high degree of uncertainty that taints inter-Asian
as well as Russian-Asian relations. The myriad of inter-state
relationships and overlapping concerns in this region are
complex. While it may be true that in terms of narrow
American security interests the Asian region may currently be
rather quiet, the region overall is clearly in the throes of
wide-ranging uncertainty and tension.
Russian President Yeltsin's recently canceled trip to
Japan would seem to acknowledge a serious impasse in the
Northern territories issue, possibly surprising the Japanese,
whose hints of loans, grants and investment in Russia's
struggling economy was forsaken in the name of nationalistic
desires within Russia.
,
China's expanding and aggressive claims to the Spratly
Islands are being met with increased hostility by Vietnam and
Malaysia. In February, China passed a territorial waters law
over the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos and have vowed to
use force to expel any intruders." Whether these efforts are
J Sheila Tefft, "Southeast Asians Build Up Navies To Protect
Territorial Interests," Christian Science Monitor, 6 July 1992, 1.
10
hints at Chinese desires for future regional dominance or
whether they are simply asserting long held irredentist
claims, the security implications for protracted maritime
warfare in the South China Sea are ominous and will be
examined directly in Chapter II.
The United States can be seen to be subtly responding to
this particular situation:
On some matters, such as helping to keep the balance of
power in East Asia, America has a straightforward interest
in not letting China have things all its own way. This is
why George Bush's decision in August to sell jet fighters
to Taiwan was not just Texan electoral calculations but a
useful bit of Pacific geopolitics. 10
While these are clear examples of regional tension, what
must be remembered is that the rest of the nations within the
region all have concerns and a vested stake over these and
other issues; bilateral disputes are quickly becoming regional
dilemmas. The combination of semi-friendly alliances coupled
with mutual distrust within and among these nations leads to
a heightened sense of anxiety ruling the tenor of
relationships, a fact largely lost on American observers of
Asia who observe a superficially benign security environment.
In sum, one can witness the genesis of a new balance of
power emerging in and around Asia. The uncertainty over who
will control and be more and less powerful within that new
balance is the direct cause of current suspicions and tension.
10
"Deng's Last Show," Economist , 10 October 1992, 14
11
Overlapping these issues is the fact that the U.S. and even
Russia will not be satisfied to allow this restructuring to
take place absent their strong influence and even direct
intervention. Perhaps Russia and the United States may join
in pursuing mutually beneficial arrangements within this
region, pointing out just how fundamentally the worldwide
system of interrelationships has been altered in such a short
period of time.
The nations of Asia are not bluffing or trying to
intimidate the United States when they expound upon their
fears of an U.S. military drawdown in the Pacific. In
demonstration of this fear, this thesis maintains, these
nations are engaged in a perceptible and substantial arms
buildup and transition in terms of indigenous naval
capabilities
.
This naval expansion is not only quantitative , but also
reflects a fundamental shift in strategic thinking being
gradually adopted by these nations. This thinking manifests
itself in terms of the active pursuit of qualitatively
superior and distinctively modified forces from those that
have been employed in the past. These acquisitions are being
pursued from the skeptical standpoint that the United States
may no longer be a dependable regional stabilizer now that the
veil of East-West conflict has been removed from the
international power struggle, and parochial, short term U.S.
12
interests may hold sway in terms of the future for military
deployments
.
Thus, this thesis examines the recent maritime
developments within China, India, Japan, and the nations of
ASEAN. Following an examination of each of these programs in
the larger light of their individual domestic implications and
considerations, this thesis concludes with an assessment of
the American military /naval presence in the region and
recommendations for the scope of that presence in the future.
This thesis is approached from a decidedly post-Cold War
perspective. Despite considerable uncertainty, encountering a
resurgent Russia is highly unlikely, especially in the Western
Pacific. Indeed, there are clearly more important and
pressing concerns for the U.S. national interest in the region
that require American attention and focus, and it those
concerns that should drive our policy in the region and will
consequently be the focus of the final chapter.
The naval focus of this thesis reflects the view that any
future conflict within this region will almost surely be
maritime in nature. As the individual chapters will examine,
each of these nations are in varying degrees shifting the
focus of their military doctrine toward maritime warfare, and
in fact many national air forces are being structured to
effectively meet maritime threats in this largely littoral and
peninsular region.
13
There has been discussion that the Asian security
situation resembles in many ways the circumstances surrounding
the region immediately before World War II when tensions were
largely minimal and trade and local development were being
actively pursued. During this time, only Japan could have
been considered a regional power. Today, the situation
resembles pre-World War II era in some superficial ways and
the region is seemingly in a similarly anticipatory mode in
terms of regional leadership. China, however, in no way
resembles the China of 1940, and is indeed not only a nuclear
power, but it possesses the innate resources and most
importantly the political will to be not only a regional
leader but a maritime and world power.
A struggle for regional supremacy is beginning to take
form between China and Japan. Recent rhetoric from China
concerning territorial claims, combined with a renewed call
from Japan that it be allowed to take on more of its defense
burden, point to the high probability of this stand-off. This
confrontation, in the context of the end of the Cold War and
a reduced U.S. presence, is beginning to take the shape of a
race for regional supremacy. The attendant uncertainty in the
region, forces these two powerful Asian nations to secure
their own base of power absent a defining conflict and
resultant regional stability that the Cold War brought in
terms of military security.
14
It is by no means clear who, if either, will become the
dominant regional power. The struggle could last for some
time, with, it will be shown later, the nations of ASEAN and
India vying for similar if not as sweeping control over
coinciding portions of the region.
In light of this Smo-Japanese competition, and despite
whoever comes out on top in the region, the United States
cannot afford to be an unengaged bystander as a new regional
power arrangement takes shape. As will be shown, this
necessity is not born out of a belief that U.S. presence is
desired in the region, but rather, the maintenance of strictly
defined U.S. national interests demands that a U.S. military
presence be maintained in order to provide the United States
the ability to have a determining influence on regional
security matters that bear directly on not only U.S.




II. CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. CHINESE MILITARY STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In many ways, the idiosyncracies of Chinese political
decision making and policy formulation remain as much a
mystery to the United States and the rest of the world as they
were when western merchants first arrived on the shores of
Southeast China in the 18th century. China has historically
tended to defy worldwide trends and indeed now seems to be
shunning the emerging "new world order" in whatever form it
may take. China would prefer to function as a regional
superpower as well as a global actor, but never at the
pleasure of a dominant America. Beijing's recent rhetoric
decries the perceived expansion of American hegemony at the
end of the Cold War, which, in China's eyes, is leading the




11 China has traditionally criticized the U.S. for its
perceived intrusion into the internal affairs of China vis-a-vis
human rights violations. In line with these criticisms of the
U.S., official rhetoric from the Chinese communist leadership has
historically maintained that China has no designs on regional
expansion, and that it does not intrude upon the sovereign
territory of other nations. This policy, while espoused in
official statements, has often been ignored in practice in the




The mystery of China lies not simply in the apparent
frustration brought about by faulty predictions of China's
probable actions, but also through the misinterpretation or
misreading of past foreign policies as they have affected the
West, and most specifically the United States. At least some
of the blame for these problems and misunderstandings rests
squarely at the feet of the Chinese themselves.
This chapter examines the present Chinese naval buildup in
Southeast and East Asia in the context of historical and
contemporary regional policy. It assesses the effect that
this growing naval presence will have upon the emerging
regional power structure and examines the implications for
American and indeed global policy in this vital region.
The shifting power structure this region is facing may
indeed be fueled by Chinese actions in and around the South
China Sea. China may be acting to force the issue addressed
later in the chapter in an attempt to mark its scope of
regional power, intending to use its burgeoning naval power as
the foundation for its base of regional power projection, not
suspecting that any western powers will significantly
interfere in what China perceives as a purely regional
confrontation
.
"The ambiguity surrounding great power relations, in
particular the rise of Japanese power, suggests to Beijing the
17
need to prepare for greater regional instability
.
: "" It is as
clear to China as it is to the rest of the world that this
region is now confronting considerable uncertainty. This
chapter intends to show that China plans to be an effective
actor in the reshaping of this region for purposes of
asserting itself on the world stage and also in line with its
historical desire to be free from encirclement and subsequent
invasion by an enemy attempting to mass troops on any part of
its border.
An ancillary result of the Cold War rivalry between the
United States and the former Soviet Union has been a constant
superpower presence in and around the critical sea-lanes of
Southeast Asia securing the interests of the smaller regional
nations, as they in turn for the most part pursued a policy of
non-alignment, but with a decidedly pro-western tilt. An end
to Cold War tensions will undoubtedly lead to a good deal of
apprehension among these countries, only fueled by the
possible emergence of a power vacuum that may be filled by the
Chinese and their burgeoning naval power.
China has historically been regarded as a reactive or
defensive empire with a traditionally weak military force.
When expansion of his rule was desired, the emperor sought
such enhancement through the benign development of tributary
;
- Robert S. Ross, "China's Strategic View Of Southeast Asia:
A Region In Transition," Contemporary Southeast Asia 12, No . 2
(September 1990): 101.
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states which required little or no military presence and
virtually no invading or occupying force being established.
The tribute states simply paid their tribute out of
convenience and the accompanying uncertainty as to the
punishment for non-payment as well as mutually beneficial
treatment in terms of trade. The weakness of this system was
displayed by the fact that the farther a tribute state was
from Peking, the more likely it was to defy the Emperor
(Annam, e.g.) . 13
While this evaluation is generally accepted to be the
case, it is my thesis that there is a proactively aggressive
aspect of Chinese military heritage that has been ignored or
disregarded as insignificant as a force in historical
analysis, and that heritage may provide a touchstone for
future actions. There has recently been some reassessment of
Chinese history along these lines, most notably by J.K.
Fairbank
:
Why have China scholars for 2,000 years gone along with
this Confucian refusal to accept the military
establishment as an occupational class? Professional
military forces turn up all the time in Chinese history.
Our refusal to look at them as a military class suggests
that China scholars are still under the sway of the great
Confucian myth of the state, government by virtue. 14
13 John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig,
East Asia: Tradition & Transformation , Revised Edition, (Boston,
Ma.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989), 265-267.
14 John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, Ma.:
Harvard University Press, 1992), 109. This book, the last by
Professor Fairbank, contains many personal observations and
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The disdain for the military within the upper echelons of
Chinese society was largely a function of the power held by
the Confucian elite scholar/administrators and their belief
that learning, study and administration of the state was
superior to the violent ways of the warrior. Ascension to
positions of power within this system was strictly controlled
by utilization of the stringent examination system. This
system necessarily limited the upper class to only those truly
learned men, who were not simply learned, but learned in the
tradition of Confucian perpetuation of their own power.
Thus the Emperor was surrounded by these Confucian
masters, and seemingly ruled his Empire solely upon the
strength of their guidance and expertise, seldom relying on
the barbaric means of the military. While this is generally
accepted to be the case, it must be remembered who held the
primary responsibility for writing history in China; the
Confucian scholars. These men quite obviously would inflate
their own influence upon Chinese history and denigrate those
of their only possible rival for power, the military.
As Fairbank points out, however, the Emperor relied
heavily, albeit subtly, on his ability to resort to violence
and military force when required to quell regional
disturbances or border disputes. The system of interstate
political opinions about China and its relations with the world.
This reassessment of the Chinese military in the context of Chinese
history remains a distinct departure from his previous works.
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relations during the time of Imperial China was extremely
complex, and the Emperor was forced to not only rely on the
tribute system as well as interstate commerce to keep the
peace, but clearly he would be required to maintain an
adequate military force to meet any intractable situations
which threatened to tear apart his Empire.
Ruling and administrating within such a geographically
immense Empire required the maintenance of a standing military
force dispersed at critical border areas where troubles were
most likely to appear due in part to their physical separation
from the central authorities in Beijing. Upon closer scrutiny
it is clear that the "Wu" (civil order) aspect of the Emperors
rule is seen as inferior in importance to "Wen" (military
order) . ir
Fairbank is not questioning the low social position that
the military was forced to suffer within Imperial China,
rather, it is asserted that a strong military tradition as
well as the tacit approval of that tradition by the leadership
has long existed within the strict confines of the Confucian
state. The most significant event in the formation of a
viable military tradition within China occurred when the
central Asian invaders began to overrun and eventually rule
China in the form of the Liao (960-1125) , Jm (1127-1279) , and
the Yuan (1279-1386) dynasties. These conquerors brought with
15 John King Fairbank, China: A New History , 69
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them the military skills inherited from centuries as nomadic
tribesman on the hills of inner Asia, and proved once and for
all "...the utility of militarism as the source of imperial
power . • "
The fact remains that every Chinese Empire was by
definition brought down, as well as introduced, via violent
means. In retrospect it seems rather implausible that any
Empire could have been thought to persist in ruling without a
strong military and the occasional introduction of that
military in efforts to preserve the Emperor's rule and
perpetuate the Empire. The Emperor was, after all, first and
last "...the great executioner."' 7 "
The military is traditionally seen as making its modern
reemergence in terms of social respect with the ascent to
power of Mao Zedong and the rise of the "Red Army" in the
twentieth century. As a result of diminished professional
status suffered by the military, China has subsequently been
forced to rapidly modernize its military to catch up with the
west. China's failure to accomplish military modernization
earlier and at a quicker pace has led to a perception of
weakness and an inability to deal with the rising forces of
the west and, of course, Japan. Lack of technically advanced
: John King Fairbank, China: A New History , 111-112. The most
significant contribution that these tribal invaders made was the
introduction of the horse as a means of transportation and as a
vehicle during battle for the warrior.
17 John King Fairbank, China: A New History , 112.
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weapons and an intransigence concerning the adoption of
western tactics and strategies led to profound military
disadvantages in conflicts with seemingly smaller and less
powerful nations, for example Japan.
To understand the rationale surrounding China's relations
with the rest of the world, one must take into account the
intense Smocentrism that has been an integral part of the
Chinese mindset for centuries. " . . . Sinocentrism was so strong
that in the face of a superior military power, China could
draw in the foreigner and assimilate him... 13 " The Chinese
kingdom has always thought of itself as the middle of the
universe. This idea, while seemingly pompous or immodest, was
nonetheless sincerely felt. This was eventually taken to be an
operational tenet of Chinese foreign policy, and was indeed
highly successful with the foreign Mongol and Manchu
conquerors
.
...for at least three thousand years, China had been the
cultural center of the Far East- indeed of the whole
world, as far as she could see. From that culture all
peoples on the periphery had borrowed, the Japanese for
example their script. So it was perfectly right that she
should call herself the central country, the Middle
Kingdom, perfectly right that her Emperor assume cosmic
dimensions and be everywhere recognized as the Son of
Heaven, Lord of Ten Thousand Years. 19





19 Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War: 1840-1842 (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1975) , 29
.
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These ideas would come to full maturation and some would
say revision with the emergence of Mao Zedong and his "Red
Army." The professional Whampoa cadets of the Nationalist
Army led by Chiang Kai-Shek, eager to apply his recently
acquired knowledge of Soviet military organization and
training, formed the well disciplined foundation for the
Chinese Nationalist military forces. 20 While fighting against
the tenaciously dedicated peasant armies of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) led by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, these
two groups simultaneously answered the call for armed
resistance against the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and
eventually China proper. These efforts in the early days of
World War II, while not entirely successful, proved to be the
turning point for the stature of the military in Chinese
society. Most importantly the men under arms were raised up in
the eyes of the Chinese people as heroes.
The mode of military strategy and tactics adopted by Mao
were, nonetheless, antiquated by Western standards. In his
view there could be no .technological advancement that could
ever outstrip the ability of the properly motivated peasant
armies to meet that challenge. In Mao's eyes, as long as the
PLA was fighting against imperialism and the encroachment of
barbarians, they would prevail because they had the emotional
20 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1990), 338-339.
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advantage of a cause to die for, regardless of the weapons
utilized by the invaders.
Under Mao's tutelage, the guiding, albeit imprecise,
principle of warfare was termed the "People's War."
People's war is ... essentially the notion that war must
have popular support and be suited to local conditions.
In China's case this means essentially a mass army
prepared to trade space for time and men for weapons. 21
It is this concept of a "defensive offense" combined with
a seeming willingness to sacrifice soldiers indiscriminately
that has often inspired grudging disbelief from China's
enemies. The reasoning behind this strategy lies in the fact
that, in most cases, China's attackers have arrived over land,
and defense against those assaults have been conducted by the
army. Therefore, massive numbers of soldiers have
traditionally been kept under arms.
Additionally, China has long recognized the advantages
that her vast and varied geography provide when defending the
homeland." Attackers have had to literally chase the Chinese
armies around the countryside until often the enemy was too
exhausted or too far removed from resupply lines to finish the
job they had started. This "hit-and-run" strategy may sound
simplistic, but it was clearly an operating principle espoused
by Mao Zedong within the ideals of the "People's War." This
21 Gerald Segal, 58.
j: Gerald Segal, 11.
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type of guerilla warfare was seen as an extremely useful tool
against invaders on the familiar landscape, especially when
faced with superior military machinery, but not outmanned. As
Mao himself wrote in 1929:
Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our
forces to deal with the enemy. The enemy advances, we
retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we
attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue. To extend stable
base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; when
pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling
around. - ;
In the case of the Japanese occupation of China during
World War II, China suffered incomprehensible loss of life and
material at the hands of the Japanese. Japan in fact almost
succeeded in occupying the whole of China, but not quite. For
China this conflict was clearly disastrous, but it may quite
likely be the inability of the Japanese to maintain the
massive effort required in both China and the Pacific against
the U.S. that directly contributed to the end of World War II.
Since the days of Mao's "Red Army" many lessons have been
learned by the Chinese, namely, that advanced military
technology is clearly needed, although a massive amount of
troops are still kept under arms. Gerald Segal is correct
when he notes that China has been extremely pragmatic in the
historical development of its military strategy:
Jonathan Spence, 375.
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In sum, historical traditions governing the use of force
do at times match present day practice, but in no case do
they determine contemporary policy. Modern Chinese
strategy seems overwhelmingly a result of pragmatic
reactions to changing factors in any given crisis.- 4
The above quotation draws an important distinction, and
one that bears directly upon the possible shape that future
Chinese foreign policy may assume. The particular strategy
that China chooses to employ in any given circumstance will
change with the time and conditions (albeit, sometimes slowly
compared to the west) , but the goals of Chinese foreign policy
and the resulting military strategies have remained
essentially consistent over time. A primary operational tenet
of Chinese foreign policy has essentially remained unaltered
since Imperial China, namely China has attempted to avert
encroachment or encirclement by any other nation. China has
explained all offensive attacks as merely attempts at power
diffusion or as the squelching of any designs on attacking
Chinese territory that other nations may have harbored.
Certainly not all Chinese military actions have been nobly
based, but it is important to realize that China believes this
to be the case.
China purports not to have designs on imperial expansion
and wish to be merely free to assert its own autonomous rights
over the historically held lands of ancient Chinese
civilization. Their goal therefore has been to preserve the
2A Gerald Segal, 235.
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nation and prevent any one power from gaining too much control
in any peripheral area that might be perceived as a future
external threat to Chinese sovereignty. They have not always
been successful in this pursuit, and more often than not the
Chinese population and civilization were seriously harmed as
a result of foreign colonialism or imperialism, violent, or
otherwise
.
Innovations like Christian missions, Western education,
and foreign investment became two-edged, often seen as
forward steps in our long term foreign view yet also
frequently destructive to China's contemporary well being.
At stake was an entire way of life, a civilization on a
grander scale than the economics or psychology of
imperialism. - c
It is in this sense that China has learned an important
lesson from the brutal Japanese occupation in the 1940's.
This type of national humiliation is just the type of event
that China has since focused its military efforts at avoiding.
Their strategy has always centered on the maintenance of their
self -perceived superiority, and they can be counted on to
maintain their own path even as the 21st century begins. It
is in this light that they perceive U.S. encroachment in Asian
affairs as being the genesis of global designs harbored by
America for worldwide domination and hegemony. - b
' John King Fairbank, China: A New History , 189.
Ji Guoxing, "Post Cold War Pacific Asia: A Chinese
Perspective," Asian Defence Journal , July 1992: 33.
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These underlying goals of Chinese military strategy must
be kept in mind when examining the future of Chinese foreign
policy and when making predictions about China's probable
actions. The Cold War may be over, but China's lot has
remained virtually unaltered by the fall of Communism, except
for the fact that they remain the last powerful bastion of
communism. Russia is seen by China as a traitor, and as
failing to properly utilize the principles of communism to
their full potential.
In line with either a fear of being left out of the Asian
power structure, or seeing a chance to assert itself in light
of the apparent waning concern by the United States in the
region, China is beginning to affirm its own self-interests
and ancient irredentist claims around Asia.
It is the changing shape of the Chinese military structure
and its effects on Chinese foreign policy that will now be
examine
.
B. CHINA'S EMERGING NAVAL POTENTIAL
From the 1950' s up until the 1980 's the Chinese navy's
mission has been guided by the war doctrine set forth by the
former navy commander Xiao Jingguang:
...the navy should be a light type navy, capable of
inshore defense. Its key mission is to accompany the
29
ground forces in war actions. The basic characteristic of
this navy is fast deployment, based on its lightness.- 7
This statement clearly demonstrates the auxiliary manner
in which China has traditionally regarded the use of its navy.
More a coast guard and support unit for the massive armies of
China's past, the navy has never been regarded as critical to
the military potency of China, and its slow development has
clearly displayed this neglect
.
China's maritime heritage has historically been given
little to no credit in comparison with other imperial ventures
and accomplishments. But it is clear that any empire the size
of China would require the maintenance of some type of
maritime force in being, to protect seaborne and coastal trade
if for no other more aggressive requirements.
Few classically educated chroniclers, concentrated as they
were upon imperial government, ever went to sea. Chinese
seafarers did not write memoirs. Because the sea, unlike
the steppe, did not harbor any rivals for power, it had
been given little importance in Chinese history. Yet
Chinese life from the start had a maritime wing more or
less equal and opposite to the Inner Asian wing.- 8
Fairbank points out that the reliance on maritime
transport was developed long before written historical records
were maintained. According to archaeological records,
You Ji and You Xu, "In Search Of Blue Water Power: The PL.?
Navy's Maritime Strategy In The 1990's," The Pacific Review 4,
No. 2: 137.
28 John King Fairbank, China: A New History,. 191.
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however, these ancient seafarers were responsible for
providing access to the largely maritime regions of Southeast
China whose coastal/riverine areas and offshore islands were
unapproachable by land, most especially during the monsoon
seasons. It is of particular note that the Chinese are
credited with inventing the stern-post rudder, "...a key
invention of nautical technology that appeared in Europe only
a thousand years later.-""
This sea-going tradition, while essentially concentrating
on maritime trade protection, never translated into a strong
coastal defense force for Imperial China. It is only in
recent years that China has come to the realization that the
maintenance of a strong naval force capable of sustained
battle some distance from shore is critical to the protection
of its overall national security. The easing of Cold War
tensions has only caused to bring this point home even more
graphically. The possibility of a "power vacuum" emerging in
the region in and around China's coastal waters has prompted
a critical and urgent reassessment of China's naval strength
from within the power structure of the Communist party.
China does not necessarily see the emergence of a power
vacuum as a detriment, but it certainly realizes the urgent
need to prepare for this eventuality. "China, in fact, is
eager to maintain an influential regional political role so as
John King Fairbank, China: A New History , 192
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to prepare itself for an era of enhanced political and,
perhaps, military competition. "
Threats to Chinese security are seen to be shifting in the
past few years. "The more imminent threats appears less major
and come from Vietnam, India and Taiwan.-' 1 " It is not so much
the fact that the superpower threat posed by the United States
and Russia has completely disappeared, but rather that it has
receded in potential, giving rise to new threats. It is as if
the removal of Cold War tensions has lifted the lid on long
standing tensions in the region that, after all, had been
existent long before the Cold War and are now coming to
fruition. This is a theme that can be quite clearly observed
in almost every heretofore Cold War theater around the world.
As mentioned above, China has traditionally faced the
threat of invasion or imperialism from its land borders.
Today, threat perceptions have shifted decidedly away from
China's western and northern borders toward the view that any
future rivalry or threat will almost certainly arise from
China's Eastern and Southeastern coastal areas. This profound
transformation in terms of military threat perceptions
directly informs the ongoing reassessment of Chinese defense
priorities
.
Robert S. Ross, 102.
You Ji and You Xu, 140
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Additionally, China has most of its intercourse with the
rest of the world through the economic markets contained
within these regions. The inner, western and northern
sections of China remain unknown regions to most people, even
those that have trade and economic ties to China's more
prosperous regions. China's future almost certainly lies in
these critically important economic zones.
With these factors in mind it is no wonder that China
feels it necessary to revisit the importance attached to the
development and maintenance of a stronger naval force. The
Chinese leadership realizes that they have a formidable task
in trying to bring their naval forces up to date and become
capable of competing with even the other smaller, technically
advanced regional navies. 32
Even though the Chinese defense budget has come under the
same types of fiscal pressures that have affected the entire
Chinese economy, funding for the PLA is beginning to see a
shift away from troop maintenance toward the adoption of high
technology weapon systems. "...Deng Xiaoping has reaffirmed
that the Chinese Army must be reduced in size and that the
Navy must be modernized- with high grade precision and
advanced equipment. 33 " Austere programs to reduce the budget
are thus resulting in severe personnel cuts, some estimates
32 Martin Douglas, "Navies of the Far East," Naval Forces
International Forum for Maritime Power , No. 11/1991: 60-61.
' Asian-Pacific Defence Reporter , August -September 1992, 20
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positing that "...between 300,000 and 500,000 men and women
will be demobilized during the next five to six years 34 ."
While the 1992 defense budget is listed as US$6bn (a 12%
increase over 1991),'' that number reflects only a portion of
the actual funds available for defense expenditures and
research. Funds listed separately from the defense budget,
under the heading of science and technology, provide research
and development for PLA programs
.
In addition, the scope of Chinese arms sales around the
world has led to the defense budget being "almost doubled" in
the past year by the influx of these funds into defense
allocation.' Most importantly, the Chinese leadership
remains committed to maintaining the current levels of
modernization as explicated in the 1991-95 Eight Year Plan. 3
This plan can be seen to be the low limit to which Chinese
military spending will dip, with increases over the planned
allocations a possibility.
While military funding continues to be listed as the
fourth of the "Four modernizations" in China, the growing
importance of increasing naval funding is seen in recent
34 Clare Hollingworth, "PLA Faces Big Cuts," Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter , August -September 1992, 25.
5 Gary Klintworth, "Latest Soviet Carrier for Beijing Fleet?,
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter , August-September 1992, 26.
36 Clare Hollingworth, 25.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991.
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rhetoric from Beijing in statements to the effect that: "...
we should cut a few mechanized divisions so as to allocate
more funds to the navy" and "It seems increasingly clear that
the growth in China's military budget will go to the navy. 38 "
The 14th Communist Party Congress held in October, 1992
witnessed similar signals toward military/maritime
modernization and improved efficiency at the expense of
antiquated Chinese military methods. The Central Military
Commission Chairman and Party Secretary-General Jiang Zemin
spoke to these issues when he delivered his address to the
Congress
.
He said the military will be turned into a 'strong,
modernized, revolutionary regular army. Defence
capabilities will provide powerful protection for the
reforms, opening up and economic development. ' Jiang also
specifically referred to the PLA's duties as defending
China's 'sovereignty over its territory, territorial
waters and air space, its maritime rights and of
safeguarding the unity and security of the motherland.' 3
The meeting of the Congress also saw a significant shift
in the upper levels of the Communist Party leadership. While
Deng Xiaoping actively sought to reduce military influence at
the very highest levels of the Party, it is significant to
note that General Liu Huaqing remains as the lone military
member of the elite standing committee, and thus a powerful
38 You Ji and You XU, 140
^ Tai Ming Cheung, "Back to the Front," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 29 October 1992, 16.
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voice of authority in terms of the effect that budgetary
constraints will have on the direction of the military.
General Liu is a long time friend and ally of Deng, as
well as a strong supporter of military reform and
modernization. Most importantly for the military is the fact
that Liu is a lifetime navy man who, as a navy commander, has
overseen the recent Chinese naval modernization and it is
anticipated that his "...commanding position in defence
decision-making could see particular attention paid to these
40 iiareas
.
In their pursuit of building a stronger navy, China has
been particularly careful to expound upon the strategic
purposes for its newly emboldened maritime force. The new
strategy encompasses four specific goals. 41 (1) Capture defend
and/or occupy island territories . This is regarded as an area
where conflict could arise very soon in the near future as
China has disputed claims with Vietnam and others over the
Spratly and Paracel Island groups. (2) Protect and conceal sea
transportation lanes. In conjunction with the island groups,
control over the critical sea-lanes of communication (SLOC's)
in the vicinity of China's coast will be critical to the
outcome of any such dispute. (3) Coastal defense. This
would amount to an upgrade of their present "green water" or
40 Tai Ming Cheung, 15
4; You Xi and You XU, 142
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coastal patrol naval capabilities. There has recently been an
upsurge in piracy along the Southeastern coast of China and
along Vietnam's eastern coast in the South China Sea (4)
Deterrence
.
Seen as central to the new concept of naval power
in China. The new navy will be looked upon as a symbol of
national and international prestige and might. It is in this
sense that the navy will be used in a "power projection" role.
It is in the exercise of power projection where some analysts
see China's greatest weakness in terms of dealing with
regional threats and asserting its interests throughout the
area . 4J
An examination of Chinese naval hardware and intended
purchases will clearly point out the shift in emphasis away
from coastal defense to blue water power projection in terms
of this new concentration on deterrence capability:
The concept of deterrence constitutes the core of the
navy's maritime strategy. The navy commander, Zhang
Liangzhong, commented: 'A peacetime navy is the symbol of
power of a country' . As a weak sea power, China suffers
from lack of credibility in carrying out its political and
diplomatic objectives. 43
The Chinese navy currently possesses 1 "Xia" class
strategic submarine, 4 "Han" class tactical nuclear powered
submarines, and 88 conventional submarines (84 "Romeo" class,
4
- William T. Tow, "Naval Power and Alternative Security
Postures in a 'Post-Cold War' Asia Pacific Order," Journal of the
Australian Institute , November 1991: 46.
43 You Ji and You Xu, 142.
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of which 34 are operational, 3 upgraded "Ming" class and 1
improved "Romeo") . It is rumored that no new "Xia" class
submarines will be built in order to put greater emphasis and
funding into developing a more modern and larger ballistic
missile submarine 44 . The maintenance of 5 SSBN/SSN's places
China third in the world in terms of numbers of sea-launched
ballistic missiles. 4 "'
What remains clear is the dedication which the PRC is
demonstrating toward the development of a strategic deterrent
in terms of a powerful submarine force. 4b It is true, as
noted above, that the bulk of the Soviet made older "Romeo"
class submarines do not in fact go to sea. It is, however,
the development of new classes of submarines that bear
consideration and attention in the future. There is an
observable commitment within the leadership of the PRC toward
funding the research and development of a technically advanced
submarine force, that if even partially realized will be
unrivalled in all of Asia.
The emerging threat as perceived by the Chinese, however,
requires a more wide-ranging response in terms of types of
naval platforms. The rapid expansion of the navy's "blue
water" surface force capability is clearly needed to conduct
44
"The Military Balance 1991-92," 139
45 You Ji and You Xi, 143.
46 Martin Douglas, 60.
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the above mentioned power projection role and assert Chinese
interests well offshore in the South China Sea. While an
improved surface fleet is certainly on the agenda, it is the
timely acquisition of an aircraft carrier that is seen as the
foundation of the new Chinese navy.
If the navy has a carrier with forty aircraft on board, it
can achieve the combat effectiveness of 200 to 800 coast-
based fighters in air support functions. And the area
under control of a convoy headed by a carrier is fifty
times as large as that controlled by a convoy of
destroyers. The navy only needs one such task force to
control the entire sea and air space around the Nansha
Islands . 4
"
There have recently been rumors that the Chinese are
interested in purchasing the former Soviet (now Ukrainian)
aircraft carrier "Varyag." While some haggling over the price
being proposed by Ukrainian officials have stalled such talks,
it remains clear that China is willing to negotiate the terms
of the deal. Of particular note is the fact that the
U.S.$2.4bn price tag would almost wipe out China's budget for
weapons procurement, but there is hope in China that the
Ukrainian officials will be willing to accept barter goods as
partial payment for the carrier. i6 While this vessel is not
even completely built, it would be a welcome addition to the
47 Martin Douglas, 145.
4a Tai Ming Cheung, "Loaded Weapons: China on Arms Buying Spree
in Former Soviet Union, " Far Eastern Economic Review , 3 September
1992, 21.
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Chinese fleet and undoubtedly send shock waves throughout the
rest of Asia.
The surface component of the PLAN is modest but also
undergoing modernization in line with the shifting threat
perceptions in the region. China has 57 principal surface
combatants, primarily destroyers and frigates purchased or
manufactured via license from Russia. 4 " The locally built
"Kotlin" destroyers are a variant on the Soviet "Luda"
class"', and design improvements are being made as "Styx"
SSM's have been incorporated into the fire control system and
hull modifications have been made to enable the deployment of
1 French built "Dauphin" Z-9A helicopter. In addition to the
19 destroyers and 37 smaller frigates, the Chinese possess
some 215 missile patrol craft, 160 torpedo patrol craft, as
well as 1 minelayer and 127 mine counter-measures craft. 51
In line with China's desire to protect offshore island
possession from occupation and in the interest of being able
to seize those islands from an occupying force, they have
significantly built ur their amphibious capability. The
largest of these vessels are the 3 "Yukan" class LST's capable
of carrying 200 troops and 10 tanks apiece. These complement
4
'
"The Military Balance 1991-92," 140
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the 13 ex-U.S. "Shan" class LST's which are quite old but can
carry 150 troops and 16 tanks apiece. c' 2
The maritime nature of the region under question and the
relative proximity to the mainland of these islands gives
China the luxury of being able to utilize medium to long range
land based aircraft in direct support of their naval forces.
This is another area where Russia and its eagerness to sell
arms for hard cash or barter has aided the Chinese. Of recent
note is the signing of a contract worth U.S.$1 billion for the
purchase of 24 Su27 fighters. Half of these jets have been
delivered. There have been additional rumors that China has
purchased MiG31 Foxhound fighters, and more significantly the
Tu22M bomber with an impressive range of 4, 000km. :
China has insisted in the negotiations for all these
weapons and systems, that they are meant for defensive
purposes only. It would seem clear that most of these
aircraft and naval vessels could be brought to bear in an
offensive mode with little to no alteration. What is evident
from the types of equipment being purchased and the pace and
enthusiasm with which China has pursued these various
contracts is the fact that they are clearly preparing for
threats from seaward areas and intend to meet or deter those
52 „ The Military Balance 1991-92," 140
53 Tai Ming Cheung, 21.
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threats with the enhanced capabilities these purchases would
provide
.
With these facts in mind it is apparent that China's naval
modernization will continue at a moderate pace in line with
domestic and economic considerations. China has long term
interests throughout the region it clearly intends to see are
maintained. Finally, it is important to remember that the
intentions for the upgrade of the Chinese navy were clearly
voiced well before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
rising tide of democracy around the world. In light of these
profound international developments, it would only stand to
reason that China will aggressively push this modernization
program forward in an attempt to assert itself in a region
where China may find herself the dominant actor in an area of
vast resources and expanding economic opportunities.
While this modernization is being undertaken with no overt
intention of military expansion by the Chinese, there remains
a good deal of skepticism around the whole of Asia concerning
Chinese intentions for the future.
C. CHINA'S EMERGING REGIONAL POLICY
It stands to reason that with the emergence of a stronger
Chinese navy patrolling the SLOC'S of Southeast Asia, a
reassessment of China's relationship with the smaller nations
of this region would be appropriate.
42
Steven Levine took an overview of Chinese regional policy
and reached the following cogent conclusions:
China's security concerns focus on Asia, and its military
power does not extend beyond the region. Its political
and cultural influence have been strongest in Asia, and
the largest proportion of its foreign trade is conducted
with its Asian neighbors. . . .Although much, if not most, of
China's foreign policy is focused on Asia, at the
conceptual level the Chinese rarely think in regional
terms at all... To a significant degree, China has been a
regional power without a regional policy. 54
It is this seeming contradiction between practice and
theory that needs to be addressed in the near future for China
to clearly meet the ensuing demands of a regional power.
China has historically dealt with other Asian nations only in
terms of enhancing its own international position. It is the
improvement of its regional standing which is seen by China as
a stepping stone to international acceptance and cooperation.
They will never tolerate any type of new world order designed
and led by the United States.
In the emerging era of international cooperation and
easing tensions among the superpowers, it seems apparent that
the way is clear for China to actively pursue mutually
beneficial policies in terms of its peripheral neighbors. It
is just this type of "detente" which could be quite
" 4 Steven I. Levine, "China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional
Power, " in Harry Harding, ed. China's Foreign Relations In The
1980 's (New Haven, Ct . : Yale University Press, 1984), 107.
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advantageous to China as it ardently attempts to put its own
domestic economy on the road to revival and modernization.
Robert Ross speaks to the rationale behind China's need
for a continued era of regional stability:
Beijing's regional policies aim to promote a peaceful
Asian environment in which China can focus on domestic
economic development. Indeed, Beijing must prolong the
period of regional detente, as it is still technologically
backward compared to its regional competitors. 5 '
Unfortunately it is becoming apparent that economic
cooperation and growth do not necessarily lead to the
reductions in overall tension levels between nations involved
in the pursuit of economic progress. The situation is often
looked at, rightly or wrongly, as a zero-sum game. One
nations economic gain in terms of open markets or agreements
for purchases is seen as another nations lost opportunity.
China, in the throes of historic economic reform internally,
is in the position where every economic opportunity is seen as
one more step toward both economic independence and the
survival of the communist system.
It is in light of this disturbing truth that China, as
well as the rest of Asia, must necessarily come to grips with
the fact that they need to be prepared to protect what is seen
as their national economic interests. Protection of such
interests such as oil wells, fishing areas, and exclusive
Robert Ross, 10:
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economic zones, in some cases requires the threat of the use
of force. While negotiation and economic cooperation lends a
degree of stability to these issues, there are apparently some
intractable situations arising in the region, most notably in
the South China Sea
.
The Spratly Islands lie directly off the Eastern coast of
Vietnam and are claimed in at least some part by Vietnam,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, as well as China.
The recent naval acquisitions mentioned above, as well as the
newly acquired technology for inflight refueling (via Israel)
has emboldened the Chinese to declare the entire South China
Sea as sovereign territory to 1600km south of Hainan
Island. " They remain the most powerful contender to these
islands, but are meeting with harsh criticism as well as
occasional resistance, most notably from the Vietnamese.
A law passed by China in February claimed all the
Spratly' s, the Paracel Islands as well as the Japanese
administered Senkaku Islands as territorial waters and
reserved "...the right ,to use force to expel intruders. 57 "
The area is believed to be rich' in liquid natural gas as well
as petroleum and China has recently signed an exploration
"Spratly Islands Rivalries Bring Regional Navies Into
Focus," Jane's Defense Weekly , 22 August 1992, 19.
57 Sheila Tefft, "Southeast Asians Build Up Navies To Protect
Territorial Interests," Christian Science Monitor, 6 July 1992, 1.
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agreement with Crestone Corp. of Denver Colorado to explore
the possibility of energy deposits in the area.
The fact remains, however, that all the claimants to this
area, except Brunei, have military installations in the
Spratly Islands. Up to this point none of them have taken any
more direct action than protesting China's designs on the
islands. : China would seem to have anticipated this reaction
and is pressing ahead with its intentions of developing the
area. There has been little response from the west, although
the recent sale of F-16's to Taiwan from the U.S. would seem
to indicate Washington's displeasure with China's growing
expansionist tendencies.
Of particular importance to the Japanese in this issue is
the safe passage of raw materials and petroleum that must pass
through these waters enroute to Japan. Any interruption in
the flow of those goods could have a significant impact on the
Japanese economy.
In addition to these difficulties is the issue of Taiwan
itself which China claims as its territory. While Taiwan
proudly claims itself to be part of a single China, the
present communist leadership in Beijing stands in direct
contrast to the Taiwanese pluralistic parliamentary system.
Fortunately, only an unlikely overt declaration of
independence by the Taiwanese could result in violent
58 Hormuz P. Mama, "Tensions Mount Within the Asia-Pacific
Region," International Defense Review , August 1992, 731.
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confrontation. In fact relations between the two have been
improving steadily in recent years as free trade barriers have
been removed and "...it is estimated that Taiwan-based
companies have invested at least U.S.$3bn in China since the
late 1980 's. 5 ''"
It remains the smaller nations of Southeast Asia, and
particularly Vietnam, that are the most concerned over Chinese
intentions in and around the South China Sea. They have the
most to lose from Chinese domination as well as precious
little force they can bring to bear against the growing
Chinese naval presence. It will be seen in Chapter V that
prudence dictates that these countries prepare for regional
confrontation, and that preparation takes the form of naval
modernization
.
The truth remains that China would be rather well served
by the maintenance of the status quo in this region. It would
undoubtedly benefit from a continued U.S. military presence in
the area, as this would allow China to improve its domestic
situation while modernizing the navy at its chosen pace.
China is also carefully pursuing the resolution of its
irredentist claims via diplomacy, negotiation, as well as
military deployment. Beijing pursues this seemingly
contradictory, two-tiered approach on the assumption that the
U.S. will not interfere in these largely regional issues.
59 Hormuz P. Mama, 731.
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Finally, while the Japanese are concerned with Chinese
intentions, the perception of the Japanese by the Chinese is
as equally complex and bears careful examination. Japan
clearly has the ability and the intention to be a major
participant in the reconstitution of the power structure in
Southeast Asia. They have already opened up highly lucrative
markets in the area, and now see China as possessing huge
economic potential, especially in terms of a large untapped
labor force.
Chinese misgivings about Japanese intentions are serious
at best
:
...Beijing's interest in promoting Sino-Japanese economic
co-operation is accompanied by Chinese apprehension of
Japan's alleged "great power" ambitions in Asia. Of
particular concern to Chinese leaders is the trend in
Japanese military spending. bU
China sees the emergence of a any type of power vacuum in
Southeast Asia as opening the markets in this region wide for
Japanese expansion and exploitation. China clearly can not
compete economically with Japan, and only the rapid expansion
and modernization of the Chinese navy will allow them to
challenge Japan on the high seas, which will be their primary
chance of ensuring some type of power base.
As will be seen in Chapter IV the Japanese navy has grown




utilization of some U.S. technology and assistance. Japan
would undoubtedly rule the waves of the region if the United
States were to leave the area today. This development is of
course another reason that China may like to see a continued
U.S. presence in the region. The historic distrust and indeed
hatred of the Japanese by the Chinese surely transcends any
short term misgivings that China may have about a western
superpower patrolling China's adjacent sea-lanes.
It is out of this rather murky combination of regional
dynamics that China must form a coherent regional policy to
address its own needs and the very real fears of its
neighbors . It would seem that China needs to become a
cooperative and trusted regional force if it is to be accepted
as a global power. China clearly has at least voiced its
intentions to meet these goals. Whether internal political
dynamics and regional suspicions of ulterior motives will
derail such efforts can only be guessed. What is clear is
that the simmering threat level is slowly rising within the
region, and one of the major reasons is Chinese attempts at
marking its place within the emerging power structure. It
also seems clear that the cornerstone of China's future
regional policies clearly rests in the emergence of an
emboldened navy.
If China is successful in its various efforts at acquiring
advanced submarine technology and mid-to-long range
bomber/strike aircraft, the balance of power in the entire
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Asian region would clearly begin to tilt in China's direction.
Considered in conjunction with naval advancements and the
aggressive affirmation of territorial rights in the South
China Sea, China looms as a genuine threat to Asian stability
and as such warrants careful scrutiny by the United States.
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III. INDIA'S EVOLVING NAVAL FORCE
A. HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
South Asia is unique in the sense that it's core sector is
represented by only one state. In terms of size,
population, resources, economic and military potential,
the pivotal position of India is so striking that it
accounts for most, if not all, asymmetrical forces in the
region. India covers almost 78 per cent of the total
area, 73 per cent of the total population and 77 per cent
of the gross domestic product of the region. 61
Notwithstanding the immense physical size, population and
strategic centrality of India, it seems as if the United
States regarded India as merely a significant afterthought
throughout the duration of the Cold War. While Russia
considered the friendship between India and the former Soviet
Union as a foreign policy victory, the United States never
took as great an interest in pursuing Cold War alliances in
the region.
Indeed South Asia b ~ on the whole was viewed by the United
States and Russia, perhaps properly so, as strategically less
significant in comparison to other more volatile areas of the
61 Manorama Kohli, "India and South Asian Cooperation," The
Indian Journal of Political Science 49, No . 3 (July-September 1988) :
301-302
.
62 South Asia is generally accepted to include: India ,
Pakistan , Bangladesh , Bhutan , the Maldive Islands , Sri Lanka , and
Burma
. This group also constitutes the entire membership of the
South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
.
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East-West conflict (Eastern Europe, Northeast Asia) . The
nations of South Asia in turn remained non-aligned in
principle throughout the Cold War. However, various subtle
and not so subtle allegiances came to be common knowledge and
inevitably affected the pace and manner of economic and
military development that these nations were simultaneously
pursuing within the context of the "Non-Aligned Movement"
(NAM)
.
This chapter attempts to assess, within the post Cold-War
context, the shifting strategic importance of India as the
pivotal nation within the South Asia and Indian Ocean region.
The bulk of the chapter is written from the perspective that
India's future domestically, regionally, and internationally
must be formulated in the context of a growing and complex
domestic debate. The various factions of political, ethnic
and religious groups within India serve to make the
reassessment of Indian foreign policy all the more difficult.
Following a historical overview of the geographical and
strategic importance of India, this chapter assesses the
extent of India's influence throughout the region as well as
observing what problems India may have in terms of her
neighbors. It then focuses on an in-depth analysis of the
recent growth of the Indian Navy. In examining the Indian
Navy, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the possible
use of the navy as a tool of leverage in the ongoing
restructuring of India's foreign policy and possibly expanding
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scope of influence throughout the region. Finally, an
assessment is made of India's possible options in the post-
Cold War era, especially in the Asian and Southeast Asian
region
.
An understanding of India's past, and more importantly its
future, must first focus on the unique geographical
characteristics that India possesses both in terms of its size
and also in relation to the dominant position that it occupies
at the crossroads of international trade and commerce in the
Indian Ocean.
The Indian Ocean, and South Asia in general sits astride
the Asian-Pacific rim to the east and Southwest Asia and the
Middle- East to the west. India itself occupies a land mass
of 1.3 million square miles in the critical central area
jutting far south into the Indian ocean. Possessing an
immense coastline (4800 miles) and claiming a massive 2
million square mile "Exclusive Economic Zone" (EEZ), India is
clearly a maritime nation dependent upon 95% of its trade from
the sea, oil supplies being the most important of those."'
The importance of the sea is reinforced by the fact that
overland trade and commerce has traditionally been
particularly difficult with rugged mountain terrain lining
India's northern and northwestern borders.
b3 G.V.C. Naidu, "The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia 13, No . 1 , (June 1991): 73.
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Throughout its history, territorial and economic
imperialism has found roots in India either as a result of
military conquest or in the form of economic/political
colonialism. Indeed much of the current ethnic and cultural
diversity that is both a blessing and a curse for India can be
traced to these various efforts at bringing India under the
control of invading armies.
Invasions and conflict dot India's violent and complicated
history. In 32 6 Alexander the Great invaded northern India
with an army of 30,000 men and horses and stormed his way to
the fifth river of the Punjab region essentially unopposed
until rising dissatisfaction in his own ranks persuaded
Alexander to leave India to the ascending Mauryan Empire. 54
Following this first imperial unification by the Mauryans
(Buddhist) was the rise of Islam to the West and the
inevitable struggle that the clash of these two diametrically
opposed religions and cultures would almost certainly
engender. It was also during this time period that Hinduism
and Jainism came to slowly gain in popularity among the masses
and Hindu legal codes would eventually come to be accepted as
the norm, and indeed Hindu would in time become the dominant
religion in India.
The subsequent invasions and eventual domination of India
under the Mughal (Islamic) leader Babur (1526) ultimately
64 Stanley Wolpert, A New History Of India (New York: Oxfor
University Press, 1989), 56.
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resulted in the unification, bloody as it was, of the
civilized portions of northern and western India under an
Islamic imperial government.
By the dawn of the sixteenth century, India was thus not
only fragmented politically, but divided spiritually into
many religio-philosophic camps... So desperate was the
political struggle for power in the north that Western
Europe's vanguard, the Portuguese, who had reached the
Malabar coast in 1498 and since then returned in ever
greater force to secure a toehold of trade, went
unnoticed, undiscussed in Delhi. 05
It is clear even at this early stage of Indian involvement
in international affairs that there were some serious
difficulties in determining India's status as a nation and
precisely who were to be properly called "Indians." As the
above quotation intimates, things were not about to become any
easier as the West was quickly discerning the value of trade
with, through and from India. The British colonial period
would prove, however, to be radically different from other
periods of imperial domination within India in so far as the
remnants of the "British Raj" would eventually come to be
enmeshed in the post-colonial administration of the
independent government and military as India struggled to
further define its proper role in the 20th century.
India itself is responsible for an imperialism of a more
subtle but possibly more profound type. In terms of religious
and philosophical thought India has played a major role in
Stanley Wolpert, 121.
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spreading the tenets of both Buddhism and Hinduism from its
position at the pivot point of overland and seaward trade
routes. Buddhism found its way to China via the Silk Road and
would eventually find deep if somewhat mutated roots in China,
Japan, Korea and the whole of Asia. While Buddhism would
remain a strong minority religion in India, it is in other
parts of Asia that it would accumulate its greatest number of
followers
.
The expansion of Hinduism is traditionally seen as more
closely associated with Indian influence in the insular and
peninsular nations of Southeast Asia. While Hinduism was
influential for a period, it would eventually be replaced by
Buddhism in many of these countries, although the cultural and
social remnants of Hindu customs and traditions remain. In
fact with the significant exceptions of the Philippines
(Catholic), and Malaysia and Indonesia (Muslim) the dominant
religious affiliation in Southeast and South Asia (less India)
is Buddhism.
What is striking is that while other countries have a
somewhat eclectic mix of religions and cultures reflecting
influences from around Asia, it is only India that has a
majority of Hindu followers (83%) . In fact only Bhutan (25%)
and Sri Lanka (15%) have even a significant minority of Hindu.
This overview is essential and may prove enlightening when
trying to discern some of the deep seated but complex problems
of trust and cooperation that these nations face when
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attempting to forge any type of multilateral agenda. There
are, of course, more aspects to India that set her aside and
apart from many of her neighbors. Functioning as the world's
largest democracy is not the least of those differences.
India faces many severe challenges, not only regionally
and internationally, but also in terms of successful
perpetuation of the democracy under which it has lived since
the adoption of a formal constitution in 1950. The system,
then as now, is closely patterned on the British model with a
representative Parliament and a Prime Minister with
significant but closely limited powers exercised largely at
the discretion of the Parliament. The government is purposely
structured to provide strict central control. As opposed to
the U.S. system, any residual power not specifically allocated
to the state is relegated to central control. The actual
amount of productive cooperation that occurs between the
states and the central government is largely a function of the
nature and loyalties of the dominant parties within those
respective legislative bodies. 60
In terms of mechanics and organization, India seems well
prepared to carry on the democratic model. India faces unique
and troublesome difficulties, however, in maintaining the
democratic structure and concurrently ensuring that economic
reforms and progress keep pace with the rest of the west and
b0 Judith M. Brown, Modern India: The Origins Of An Asian
Democracy (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 343.
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indeed the Third World. It is in these respects that it is
clearly simplistic to think of India in any light resembling
the tradition of western democracies. The bottles may be the
same but the wine is clearly quite different.
Fostering regime legitimacy in terms of a democratic
leadership can prove particularly difficult in developing
nations which are pursuing economic progress simultaneous with
the adoption and maturation of a democratic system. As one
observer has commented:
The conflict is compounded by the fact that in most Third
World societies social control is widely diffused among
many heterogeneous social organizations that over the
years have developed their strategies of survival and
cannot be easily molded ... legitimation together with
compliance and participation are seen as indicators of
increasingly levels of social control by the state. ,;
Thus, while India may indeed possess an impressive
democratic system based on the successful British model, it is
clear that the existence of the system in and of itself does
not guarantee that the people will either understand the
system or more importantly respect its authority. The
acquisition of legitimacy is critical in so far as it allows
democratic norms the chance to replace and overtake long held
and traditional beliefs and customs, which by their nature may
have run counter to the very democratic values being sought.
Kuldeep Mathur, "The State And The Use Of Coercive Power I
India," Asian Survey 32, No. 4 (April 1992): 339-340.
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India has survived, however, as a democracy for quite a
long time contrary to the predictions of a good many
doomsayers. Nevertheless, to ignore the inherent difficulties
in ensuring the survival of the democracy would be to dismiss
a fundamental challenge to India's future. These facts taken
in the context of the other more tangible social and ethnic
difficulties to be addressed later in the chapter, provide the
bulk of India's domestic challenges and have a direct and
significant impact on the conduct of foreign relations.
In terms of the Indian military, the ties to the British
example are even more pronounced than in the civilian
government. This has occasionally caused consternation among
government officials who have felt that the military is too
British. The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) (the post-
independence version of the Indian Civil Service) continues to
this day to train and recruit in the tradition of the "raj".
English remained the medium of recruitment and training,
military lifestyle and social conventions remained; as did
a tradition of elegant professionalism and career
orientation, and non-involvement in political matters. . .
.
The legacy of an apolitical army has been of great
significance in India's very existence as a democracy, in
sharp contrast to the experience of newly independent
territories in other continents, or in neighboring
Pakistan. 08
The degree of separation that the military establishment
enjoys from the political system is clearly an advantage for
b3 Judith M. Brown, 346.
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the present day leadership in India. It is for this reason
that the Indian government is particularly scrupulous in
keeping the military clearly delineated and as a separate
entity from the internal paramilitary and police forces that
are used so extensively to suppress domestic violence and
dissent and even border conflicts that may have convoluted
origins and involve multifarious domestic issues.
Pursued in conjunction with (it is hoped) the healthy
survival and perpetuation of the Indian democratic system is
the simultaneous quest for economic expansion and improved
technological advancements with aid received from the advanced
economies of the world. While this is a traditional if
somewhat hackneyed plea of developing countries, in India the
dream has at least in part become a reality.
In terms of economic potential, India poses a paradox.
Possessing a huge professional middle class, it is capable of
competing in a number of international high technology and
service sectors quite well. Superimposed upon this optimistic
outlook, however, are t,he devastating population and hunger
crises that continue to plague the entire country and serve to
sap much of the potential for economic growth and resource
development that might otherwise be observed.
As of the present period India functions extremely well in
producing and exporting goods to other Third World countries.
While this is clearly beneficial in terms of balance of trade
and employment, in the long term it spells only stagnation and
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possibly even economic regression in terms of competing with
the west. India needs to streamline the transfer of
technologies from the drawing board to the factory, if it is
to hope to compete with other major technological powers. 69
India's economic links with the Indian Ocean countries are
developing slowly, but in the line of ascent. Suffice it
to point out that India is on the list of principal
importers of 17 out of 27 countries of the area. It
actively exports capital, both public and private. Old
cultural ties with many countries, including the presence
of many Indian residents abroad, should also be taken into
account. All this facilitates the expansion of economic
links
.
India's economy shows signs of both hope and despair
depending upon the aspect one looks at. India's GDP growth for
1991-92 was 2.5%, with 3.5% anticipated for 1992-93. While
this represents modest growth, GDP per capita remains a dismal
$350 ($ U.S.)/ : Additionally, India's balance of trade
ballooned to negative $7.29 billion ($ U.S.) in 1 9 9 . India has
amassed a huge budget deficit that absorbed 8.5% of the total
GDP in 1991. 72 Meanwhile, the Indian economy has evolved to
69 M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, "India At The End Of The
Century: Transformation Into An Asian Regional Power, " Asian Survey
30, No. 10, (October 1990): 930.
70 M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, 940.
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the point where 40% of the economy is accounted for by the
service sector.
The government strives somewhat successfully to keep
politics and economic policy secularized and consciously
separate from the quagmire of religious and cultural
influences that could quite easily impede progress within the
international market.
The Indian government makes a conscious effort at pursuing
pragmatic and secular solutions to a wide range of problems so
as to avoid the appearance of favoring one ethnic or religious
group over another. In this sense the democratic model lends
itself well to the fair application of policy within the
diverse Indian social context . In fact the government has
often gone so far along planned development that there has
been some criticism from the west that the India leadership
was tending toward socialist policies, with the concepts of
merit and entrepreneurship being neglected. While this
accusation may or may not be fair, what is clear is that India
has a unique form of democracy that has matured in the context
of India's complex ethnic and cultural considerations.
Indeed, it is the particularly difficult task of the
Indian government to balance an inordinate number of diverse
domestic concerns and interest groups with the needs of an
ascending international economic and military power. The
daunting task of forging a domestic consensus within Indian
society and in keeping with the existing democratic norms,
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stands as the major challenge to India at the end of the Cold
War and serves as the context for the examination to which we
now turn.
B. INDIA'S FACES THE UNCERTAINTY OF POST-COLD WAR ASIA
...Indian concerns are predominant in South Asia,
especially over those of external powers who must not be
allowed to exploit crises to enhance their own positions
in the region. By implication, any attempt by another
South Asian nation to invite such outside intervention
will be considered hostile to India and grounds for Indian
retaliation. In short, Indian security policy in South
Asia is based on denying external powers a regional
foothold, with military force if necessary. 73
This description is a concise if somewhat incomplete
assessment of the approach to regional and national security
that India pursues. India has traditionally been disparaged
by internal and external critics with failing to adequately
elucidate the background and theory supporting stated foreign
policy goals. It is clear that progress has at times been
achieved in this area, but the criticism remains that those
successes were more as a result of chance than design.
"Ambivalence and flexibility" seemed to have traditionally
characterized Indian security and defense policy.' 4
In terms of regional confrontation, the long-term and
partially on-going conflicts with China and Pakistan have had
Devin T. Hagerty, "India's Regional Security Doctrine,
Asian Survey 31, No . 4 (April 1991): 352.
74 Devin T. Hagerty, 351.
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a significant impact on the conduct of both the Indian defense
planners and upon India's regional security doctrine. The
conflicts revolve primarily around border and ethnic conflicts
that arise at least partially out of a medium power insecurity
on the part of India that is implied in the above quotation.
Sino-Indian relations have been variously marked by
periods of tension and attempted resolution since the 1950 's.
This seeming contradiction is indicative of the apprehensive
but earnest manner in which both countries have approached the
diplomatic table in attempts to settle their various disputes
during this time-frame. Gains that may have been earned at
the bargaining table (Nehru's five principles of "peaceful
coexistence," for example) 7 ' have nonetheless often been
erased by violent encounters, of varying intensity, usually
occurring along their common borders.
Their primary dispute centers on the contested border
territories to the West in the area of the Karakoram Pass, and
to the Northeast at the British established "McMahon Line" in
Arunachel Pradesh, East of Bhutan. Animosity and mutual
distrust existed, however, even before this dispute manifested
itself in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. In fact
The five principles (panch shila) of "Peaceful Coexistence"
were proposed by Indian Prime Minister Nehru to the Chinese Foreig
Minister Zhou Enlai in 1954. They were: mutual respect for eac
others territorial integrity & sovereignty; nonaggression
noninterference; equality & mutual benefit; and peacefu
coexistence. This was seen as a real breakthrough in relations
only to be done in by the border dispute impasse.
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. . .China had been befriending Pakistan since the Bandung
Conference in 1955/'°" Chinese alignment with Pakistan could
only serve to make the Indians more apprehensive about China
and its possible expansionist aspirations for the region. The
Pakistani affiliation with China, coupled with India's
subsequent humiliating loss at the disputed border of
Pakistani held Kashmir in October of 1962, combined to produce
a bitterness toward the Chinese that lingers in the minds of
many Indians to this day.
In a more fundamental sense, the Indians see themselves at
an insurmountable geographic and strategic disadvantage with
respect to China. Up until the recently undertaken Indian
naval buildup, India had never posed any threat to China
itself
:
China is a major security concern for India: arguably
even the principal one. Chinese military strength lies
close to India's main centre of population and China holds
territory claimed by India. But by itself, India is a
relatively minor security concern for China. India's
military strength sets far from China's heartlands, and
weighs little compared with other threats to China's
interest' 7
During the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, Nehru's
army was getting so badly trounced that he temporarily
abandoned the guiding principle of "Non-alignment" and turned
- A.R. Basu, "India's China Policy In Historical Perspective,
"
Contemporary Southeast Asia 13, No . 1 , (June 1991): 103.
Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity And The
Great Powers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 11.
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to the United States in desperation for arms and personnel,
even though the United States had been openly shipping arms to
the Pakistani's since 1954, 78 and had been at least tacitly
treating China as a global power which had served to compound
Indian feelings of resentment
.
This graphic example points to a genuine Indian dedication
toward stemming Chinese intrusion into India, even at the sake
of appearing to align itself with one or more Western powers.
"Underlying most Indian views of China is a vein of resentment
that the PRC is perceived as a greater factor than India in
world affairs. 7 ''" This inferiority complex cannot be
overstated or disregarded as India continues to strive toward
self -definition and a meaningful role in the region.
The contested border has been the major point of Sino-
Indian dispute throughout the intervening decades since the
mid-1950 's. With the close of this century and the end of the
Cold War, the rivalries that have historically marked the
Sino-Indian relationship are likely to manifest themselves in
the struggle for dominance in the Indian Ocean and Southeast
Asian maritime regions. In addition to their bilateral
disputes, the internal dynamics that have and continue to
shape both these countries must be taken into account when
Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, 104
Steven I. Levine, 141.
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assessing the role each country may take in the near future in
terms of regional foreign policy.
India's internal ethnic and religious strife has been, and
continues to be, an exceedingly destabilizing factor for the
nation and the entire region. Any attempted change in foreign
policy or global status must be addressed in view of these
problems. The government has faced domestic opposition in the
past as it has asserted itself in regards to smaller South
Asian nations (Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives for
example)
.
The larger nations of Pakistan and China are given
preeminence by most analysts as having the most discernable
effect upon the formulation of Indian foreign policy.
Nonetheless, it is terms of Indian interactions with the
smaller nations of South Asia where there has been a tendency
to display an "...increased willingness in the late 1980 's to
assert India's greater power directly and dramatically in
smaller neighboring countries. 80 "
No better example qf Indian ambivalence can be seen than
in Sri Lanka and the handling of the Tamil separatist
movement. Waffling between open support for the "Tamil
Tigers" and a professed willingness to mediate a peaceful
settlement with the Sinhalese majority in power, India
succeeded in only confusing the issue. When India feared a
Devin T. Hagerty, 352.
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backlash in their own Tamil Nadu region if the separatist were
suppressed, Rajiv Ghandi sent relief supplies to the rebels in
the form of the Indian Air Force. The embarrassing withdrawal
of Indian troops in 1987 after the low intensity violence had
continued to wage on, left in doubt India's own ability to
handle with skill and diplomacy relatively minor difficulties
in "it's own backyard."'"
This particular illustration provides an excellent example
of the many inputs which come into play when Indian leaders
try to formulate functional foreign policy goals. The obvious
factor in Sri Lanka is the ethnic problem. India felt that it
was its duty to ensure the safety of it's "overseas" brothers.
The Tamils were not Indian citizens, rather they were related
ethnically to a vocal group within Indian society. It is
difficult to envision another country where this type of
response would be so willingly adopted.
At the same time India felt a need to demonstrate its
ability to function as the mature regional superpower and
effect a peaceful diplomatic settlement to the problem
regardless of the parties involved. Overarching these
concerns was the Indian fear that if a settlement was not
reached, other non-regional actors might be requested to come
to the aid of the legitimate Sinhalese government. To India
this would be the ultimate embarrassment. The result was, and
Devin T. Hagerty, 356.
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often has been, the seeming ambivalence referred to above.
Another example was the Gulf Crisis and India's similarly
equivocal response in terms of siding with the coalition or
remaining impartial to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
The fact remains that India has been a group of societies
and cultures far longer than it has been a unified nation.
The difficulties faced by the government in instilling
legitimization having often failed, lead inevitably to the use
of coercive force and harsher treatment of dissenters in the
society. It is in this sense that India faces different and
deeper problems of consensus building than do other
democracies
.
The political mechanisms of competition and voting exist,
but they are increasingly being overwhelmed by force and
coercion. Failures of legitimization of state power and
inability to resolve political conflicts do not appear to
be consequences of poor economic performance alone. They
lie at the very root of the historical and social
processes of state and nation building. 3 ~
In fact it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
domestic and regional problems in India. The other nations of
South Asia have so much in common with India that this
commonality sometimes tends to lead to a mistrust of India's
overpowering economic and military strength. SAARC has been
long touted as a vehicle for solving some of the difficulties
of the member nations while at the same time strengthening the
Kuldeep Mathur, 349.
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entire group in the eyes of the west by combining resources
and competing around the world.
In the eyes of the Indians SAARC could function well in
terms of "...reaffirming the zone of direct Indian interests
and legitimizing India's leadership in the region. iJ " This
concept does not sit well with some of India's neighbors,
although there is some confidence that with India's increased
involvement and economic trade with it's neighbors that SAARC
could possibly become "...if not a military than an economic
and political bloc of the ASEAN type. 34 "
It would clearly be in the interest of the region to
further strengthen the economic ties and cooperation between
the members of SAARC. While India would clearly be the key
player in such a revitalization, it must also at the same time
take great pains to assure her South Asian counterparts that
Indian goals are not economic imperialism and expansion and
that India is capable and willing to assume a partnership role
vice a leadership role in this enterprise. Taking the above
noted examples of regional strife in which India has played an
antagonistic role, however, the possibility of assuaging
regional concerns over Indian intentions may prove to be
difficult indeed.
M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, 92 9
i4 M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, 929
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The restrengthening of SAARC is an example of the new type
of fresh thinking that India feels is necessary in the post
Cold-War era. Whether regional intricacies and long held
mistrust can be overcome will provide the true test of
success. For it is clear that absent an East-West conflict to
be "non-aligned" against, there has appeared a lack of
direction and muddiness in the waters of international
relationships and in Indian foreign policy.
While pursuing possibly improved regional cooperation and
discourse, India is simultaneously posturing its military
forces to similarly take the lead in regional security issues.
This shift in regional strategy has in fact been evolving for
some time, but with the end of the Cold War regional buildups
around the world are going to come under more close
international scrutiny. It is to an examination and
assessment of the Indian Navy to which we now turn.
C. INDIAN TOOLS OF LEVERAGE: THE GROWTH OF THE INDIAN NAVY
Most of the recent acquisitions by the Indian navy are of
an offensive nature and have power projection capability.
The Indian navy is the largest among the Indian Ocean
littoral states and the seventh largest in the world. If
the naval officials succeed in their ambitions for the
Indian navy, it would become the fourth largest in the
world. 85
85 G.V.C. Naidu, 73.
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In terms of military strength, India dominates the region
in similar magnitude to its geographical and economic might.
The other nations of the region are well aware of this
dominance, and this supremacy serves as a double-edged sword
for India. India faces the dual task of quelling smaller
regional nations' fears of Indian military expansion and
domination while at the same time preparing to meet the
challenges of the rapidly transforming regional power
structure
.
In essence India must face three separate directions at
the same time when reassessing its security posture. It must
first address domestic groups that do not desire India to
become involved in any foreign disputes in keeping with the
traditional tenets of non-alignment. Then India needs to be
concerned about its neighbors and their perceptions of Indian
aggressiveness and expansion. Some regional powers are
similarly concerned about preserving the non-aligned status
quo, and additionally they fear Indian domination leading to
their own voices and concerns being given less credence on the
world stage.
Lastly, India must be concerned about how it is perceived
by the rest of the world, and specifically the United States.
India has a deep desire to be seen as a major international
player, and like it or not, the United States is the sole
remaining superpower, and as such will provide much of the
backdrop for the conduct of future international
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relationships. In pursuit of this position it is India's
belief that the coveted status of "international power" can
only come with both military and economic prowess. It is
through naval power projection that India plans to pursue
military prominence and international prestige.
Similar to the Chinese, the Indians intend to make the
1990 's the decade in which they emerge "as a major regional
power of Asia.' b " To facilitate this transformation, they
also intend to project their naval power as the bulwark of
their regional policy. India, however, unlike China, already
has a large and powerful navy, rivalled in all of Asia only by
the Japanese.
In addition to a qualitative and quantitatively superior
naval force, India has the additionally important trait of a
rich naval tradition. The Indian naval heritage has been
inherited practically whole-cloth from the British. After
independence, Royal Navy officers even served in the Indian
Navy for a period of time. The traditions and customs of the
Royal Navy have been enthusiastically incorporated into the
present day Indian Navy. Additionally, the British and the
Indians have been conducting joint naval exercises and the
Indian fleet has traditionally looked to Great Britain for the
furnishing of "hand-me-down" naval vessels. This important
aspect of Indian naval power carries over into the methods of
6b M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, 927
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training of sailors and officers and technical expertise, and
as a result leads to the Indian Navy more closely resembling
a traditional western navy than a Third World navy.
In terms of naval hardware and weapons systems, India is
clearly the leader in South Asia. Since the 1970 's India has
been engaged in a naval revitalization and modernization
program that has witnessed the naval budget being increased
some 200 fold in 40 years and accounting for 13% of the entire
defense budget. 3 This dramatic increase in funding over a
long period of time has resulted in the current overall
strength of the Indian Navy.
The Indian Navy owns two aircraft carriers of the
vertical take-off (VSTOL) variety; the "Vikrant" (formerly the
HMS Hercules, built in 1943), and the 23 year old "Viraat"
(ex-HMS Hermes). 88 While these fixed-wing and large
helicopter capable vessels are getting old, the Indians have
been faithfully upgrading them with new systems and
progressive modernization. Nonetheless, the "Vikrant" is
"showing her age, and needs replacing as a matter of
urgency. 89 " Delays in settling on the final terms of a
contract with the French for the construction of a third
carrier has now put in jeopardy not only that acquisition, but
M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, 936.
Anthony Preston, "India's Naval Expansion," Asian Defend
Journal
, September 1992: 66.
89 Anthony Preston, 66.
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puts into question the ability of the "Viraat" to outlast the
waiting period for her follow-on replacement.
The Indian government has recently made overtures about
purchasing two of the remaining Russian aircraft carriers,
"Admiral Kuznetsoz" and "Varyag" (the one the Chinese would
also like)
.
While no deals have been finalized, this would
certainly help India's problem of replacing her aging
carriers . 90
India's submarine force includes 7 "Foxtrot" boats
acquired in the late 60' and early 70 's, and the newer 8
"Kilo" submarines have all entered the fleet and are phasing
out the older "Foxtrots." 91 Early hope over a German co-
production contract to indigenously build four "type 1500"
conventional submarines, has led to production slowdowns as a
result of poor training and lack of experience within India's
industrial base.' J
The Indians also had leased a nuclear-powered SSGN
("Charlie" class) in 1988 from Russia for a three year trial
basis, but an offer to extend the terms of that lease was not
taken up by the Indians and the submarine was returned to
Vladivostok. 93 India has, however, invested in active
90 Anthony Preston, 68.
91
"The Military Balance 1991-92," 145
92 Anthony Preston, 68.
93 Anthony Preston, 69.
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research and development of an indigenously produced, nuclear-
powered submarine. This infant project, called the "advanced
technology vehicle," is "reasonably well funded" and "the
project has priority over a new aircraft carrier." 94
India's surface fleet is particularly impressive. The
largest of these ships are the 5 "Rajput" class destroyers
(formerly "Kashin" class Russian destroyers). Armed with 2
"Goa" sea-to-air (SAM) missiles, 4 "Styx" surface-to-surface
(SSM) missiles systems, and capable of embarking an ASW
helicopter, these vessels exemplify the heavily armed ships
that were the signature of the former Soviet fleet in the
1970' and 80's. Of the 21 various escort frigates, the 3
"Godavari" class frigates are the newest and most impressive.
Capable of embarking 2 "Sea-King" size ASW helicopters, they
are also armed with "Styx" SSM's, a quadruple "Gecko" point
defense system, anti-submarine torpedoes, and German supplied
sonar.'' These carrier escorts are quite capable of
protecting the Indian aircraft carriers, as well as carrying
out independent small scale operations.
In addition to these various naval capabilities, the
Indian Navy possesses 40 assorted patrol and coastal
combatants, many armed with "Styx" SSM's. The Indians have no
mmelaying capability, but they do have 22 mine countermeasure
' 4 Captain Richard Sharpe, RN, ed., Janes Fighting Ships 1992
93 (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1992), 268.
Anthony Preston, 69.
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craft in service. The Indian amphibious ability is quite
limited, with only two relatively large "Magar" class LST's.
India's navy is clearly much more impressive than China.
India has, however, traditionally lacked any consistent
maritime strategy aimed at putting this rapidly expanding navy
to effective use." This problem looms as a problem for
India, as the rest of the region and all of Asia try to
discern Indian intentions for this obviously dominant naval
force
.
India has historically sought simply to limit external
threats, i.e., superpowers, from infringing on South Asian
territory, in line with its traditional pursuit of political
non-alignment. However, India's maritime concerns have grown
over the years and the navy has had to grow in conjunction
with those concerns. India now finds herself ranging farther
and farther from the shores of the mainland, slowly assuming
a greater and more powerful maritime role within the region.
Protection of maritime trade is India's major concern.
"Nearly 98 per cent of Jndia's trade (over US$20 billion) is
sea-borne, which includes about- 40 percent of it's crude oil
imports." 7 " Along with protection of this trade, which
entails the protection of the oil rich offshore installation
"Bombay High, " they have long been considered innovators and
9b G.V.C.. Naidu, 79.
g7 G.V.C. Naidu, 78.
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investment leaders in a potentially lucrative seabed mining
system that by some estimates could be functional by the end
of the 1990 ' s 98 (clearly aimed at gaining rights to any
offshore oil-wells that may be discovered) . These interests,
in addition to protecting Indian coastal fishing rights, are
all considered legitimate naval concerns.
Overshadowing these largely "domestic" roles for the
Indian Navy is the emerging need to present a sea-denial and
sea-control capability in the interest of posing itself as the
regional maritime power. Many of India's naval improvements
have been in response to a perceived buildup of technically
advanced land and sea forces on the part of Pakistan. The
degree of historical animosity between these two countries
cannot be overemphasized, and that situation can only get
worse in the future as India and Pakistan are free to pursue
continued military acquisitions after the Cold War.
Pakistan's military modernization (seen by India as aided
by China and the United States) has left India vulnerable to
missile attacks from Pakistani naval and shore facilities. It
is this concern, and the desire to prevent further and more
explicit foreign encroachment into the region, that drives
India's present naval modernization forward.
This is clearly part of the reason that India has
established a forward base of operations for its submarine
Majeed Akhtar, "Indian Perspectives in the 1990 's", Asian
Survey 30, No. 11 (November 1990): 1094.
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fleet at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Such a naval base
almost certainly is meant to send a message of regional
intentions to not only the nations of ASEAN, but also to China
and Japan. Similarly to these other regional powers, India
has no intention of being omitted from the inevitably emerging
power structure in and around Asia. By posturing its naval
forces as capable of sustained operations in and around the
Southeast Asian area, India has in effect changed the regional
balance of power. Combined with the emergence of the Chinese
navy and the growth of Japanese naval capabilities, Indian
submarine patrols can only serve to heighten the sense of
anxiety that the nations of ASEAN are experiencing in terms of
future regional security conditions.
While India's naval employment may seem somewhat offensive
in nature, it must be remembered that India sincerely believes
that it is functioning as a "...countervailing power in the
area, providing a stabilizing influence in the turbulent
region."4 " This role is not fully understood or certainly
accepted by many nations in South and Southeast Asia or indeed
around the world. It is clear that India's inability to
formulate clear and publicly stated policy goals for it's
burgeoning navy has left the region and the world wondering




Recent Indian rhetoric has become increasingly resolute in
their determination to lead the region. They see themselves as
preeminent and wish other South Asian nations to join them in
their quest to expand economically, while at the same time
ensuring regional integrity in terms of western powers. The
emerging competition from the Chinese and Japanese, coupled
with the possible departure from the area by the United
States, would seem to compel India to make explicit it's
desires and intentions for the region.
While economic malaise and domestic violence may cause
temporary budgetary restraints hitting all the Indian armed
forces with required cutbacks, it is clear that India's long
term goals of power projection and sea-control are best served
by a strong navy and that the navy will not be neglected.
Assuming an annual inflation rate of 11 per cent, the
overall cut to the [1992] defence budget is 6 per cent in
real terms. Within this budget, the Army sustained a cut
in real terms of about 9 per cent, the Air Force sustained
a cut in real terms of 7 per cent, while the Navy was
granted an increase in real terms of about 4 per cent. 100
In 1991, India allotted $9.03 billion (constant U.S. 1988
dollars) for military expenditures, accounting for 3.3% of
total GDP, a decrease from $9.6 billion in 1989. inj While
"1992 Annual Reference Edition," Asia-Pacific Defence
Reporter , 43 .
101
.-sxpri Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmaments,"
published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ,
1992, 260.
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funding may have recently dipped below recent high-water
marks, the overall trend has been to slowly bolster the
capabilities and mission orientation of the navy to a more
"blue-water" function. What should be looked at is not the
funding or levels of spending for the navy, rather it is
significant to observe a trend away from the traditional
constabulary/coastal patrol type naval forces to the truly
westernized type of power projection capabilities.
In accomplishing a clear description of their intentions
for leading the region India would need first and foremost to
address the concerns of their own internal fractious political
contingents, as well as address the concerns of the smaller
regional nations and indeed the rest of the world, all of whom
have an significant stake in the region. If approached within
a regionally cooperative and non-expansionist framework, India
could take a leadership role while not necessarily
overpowering or shunting their neighbors aside. Posing their
naval force as the vehicle for that leadership can be
extremely effective if a regional understanding and
appreciation for Indian intentions is attained.
Indeed, that is the crux of the subject under discussion:
what are India's goals for the future? While it is not at all
clear that even the Indians are decided on this issue, it will
be helpful to examine the range of options open to Indian as
the 21st century approaches.
81
D. INDIA'S OPTIONS EXAMINED
India's security considerations are not confined to its
immediate neighborhood but span a wider area. Measures
undertaken by India to cope with its concerns, coupled
with the lifting of many financial constraints, led to the
modernization of its armed forces. This has,
understandably, led to an increase in threat perceptions
among India's smaller neighbors and has created a feeling




It is this general feeling of apprehension on the part of
its neighbors that India must aggressively undertake to
alleviate if it is to function in an effective regional
leadership role. The debate around India's future rages
within India itself, and the debate takes the principles of
the NAM as a starting point and defines any future policy
stance or international agenda on how far removed from those
principles any new policy might be. Some want complete
departure and others complete adherence, and of course there
are those who propose a cautious middle-ground.
The fundamental changes in the international power
structure in general will necessarily affect India's future,
even more so now that the Cold War is over and India can no
longer sit on the sidelines of global politics. The mere
possession of an impressive military infrastructure and the
fielding a formidable armed forces no longer admits a nation
automatically to the elite collection of international powers.
10: Majeed Akhtar, 1084.
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Today, in a greater sense than during the Cold War, economic
prowess is as much or more an integral part of the entire
definition of national strength.
The changing nature of the interdependence of the
international economic market was undoubtedly taking shape in
the latter part of the Cold War, but went largely unnoticed as
the U.S. was actively pursuing the escalation and anticipated
conclusion of the U.S. -Soviet standoff. With that struggle
ended, the rest of the world is realizing that absent that
conflict there may be a return to a more "normal" type of
parochial approach toward the pursuit of individual national
interests and policy agenda.
For India, this fact strikes home with particular force.
Being non-aligned during the Cold War, India was kept largely
out of the ideological fray. Due to this non-alignment,
however, India was never considered a reliable ally of the
United States against the communist threat. India's position
now that the Cold War is over, provides little or no leverage
in requesting preferential treatment or development aid from
the United States.
India's economy is in a critical transition phase from
dreadfully backward toward a degree of modest growth in
development. India will be hard pressed to keep pace with the
rest of the world when other fully developed countries are
free to pursue more limited self-serving economic goals.
Absent some degree of outside assistance, this fragile
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progress will be difficult to maintain in the face of the
overwhelming population and hunger crises.
It is within this context of pressing and complex domestic
issues that the current debate concerning the shape of India's
future international role is taking place. Nowhere has this
been more apparent than in India's response to the recent Gulf
crisis
:
The Gulf crisis acted as a catalyst in the ongoing debate
in India's foreign policy community over the formulation
of a policy to meet the challenges and opportunities
offered by the post-Cold War era. While some commentators
paid tribute to [Indian Prime Minister] Chandra Shekhar
for 'bold' and 'pragmatic' foreign policy decisions,
others scorned his apparent 'tilt' toward the United
States by allowing the aircraft refueling and thus
abandoning Indian foreign policy's traditional elements of
nonalignment and Third World solidarity. 103
There are four primary options which India may choose from
in terms of its future within the region and globally.
Firstly, India may choose to stand steadfastly by the
principles of the Non-Aligned Movement and pursue that creed
in terms of refusing to be even minutely involved in other
nations affairs, so as to not be seen as "interventionist".
This is a rather unrealistic approach, especially in light of
the types of changes around the world mentioned above, and
India's recent altercations with its neighbors in Sri Lanka
and the Maldives. There are, however, a small number of
J. Mohan Malik, "India's Response to the Gulf Crisis
Implications for Indian Foreign Policy," Asian Survey 31, No.
(September 1991): 854.
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dissenters within India who would espouse such a course of
action
.
Secondly, there is what Mohan Malik calls the "realist"
approach. The "realists" were quick to point out that the end
of the Cold War provides India with some unique and important
opportunities in terms of trade and cooperation with
previously "aligned" countries. "One was the opportunity to
wean the U.S. away from its traditional ally, Pakistan.'-' 4 "
It is this school of thought that lends itself to the
realities of the end of the East-West conflict. In this
context, India would model itself as the regional leader and
pursue the formation of close cooperation with other "powers
that be" around the Asian-Pacific region. By posturing itself
as the moderate and cooperative regional authority, China,
Japan, ASEAN, and the United States would more likely give
India respect and implicit power within the region. This
option may also prove problematic in that it assumes India
would not provoke regional disturbances and additionally that
it be capable and wiling to deliver results in terms of
economic cooperation and peaceful settlement of small scale
disputes. India's recent track record does not bode well for
such possibilities.
The structural context of this type of power redefinition
within the region might fall under the United Nations, vice
104 J. Mohan Malik, 855
the SAARC . For some, the U.N. is seen as a more worldwide
organization perhaps capable (lately) of forging a growing
variety of agreements in terms of a wide range of issues. It
would seem as if SAARC simply were not designed for such a
role. Extremely pragmatic as this approach is, it is
nonetheless seen as painfully nearsighted and too
opportunistic .
The third option takes the form of a low key unilateral
expansion (militarily and economically) on the part of India
toward Southeast Asia as well as the South Asian region in
general. This option, is seen as a complete break from the
past, and while it has only a handful of advocates within
India, it is seen by India's more suspicious neighbors as the
approach being secretly pursued. This fear is based on
emotion more than an observed ability of India to succeed in
such an ambitious policy as it would not be able to muster the
economic and domestic stamina to forge this type of unpopular
policy. Not to mention that India would clearly be
overmatched in Southeast; Asia not only by the United States,
but also by the Chinese and Japanese.
The last option addresses another school of thought that
Malik mentions, and that is the "traditionalists." The
"traditionalists" strive to redefine the guiding philosophy of
"non-alignment" to make it more compatible with the somewhat
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murky future of international relationships . i(>~ The
"traditionalists" point out that the apparent lack of a clear
cut division within international beliefs and systems, does
not necessarily mean that condition will remain in place
forever
.
This is a faithfully Third World approach and thus
attractive to those who are firm believers in the foundational
principles of the NAM. In this view, the United States is
simply more dangerous now than ever before because it can
impose its will around the world without fear of reprisal, and
the NAM must steadfastly stand against this peaceful expansion
of American influence and will.
This last "traditionalist" option is the one that India
most likely will adopt. Above all else, it takes a cautious
"case by case" approach to international developments and
decides within the context of the immediate circumstances what
the proper role/response should be for India. This in fact
makes good sense, especially in India's case. The rest of the
world is in essence following the same path, although with
varying degrees of success. Confusion and "muddling through"
seem to be the watchwords of the 1990 's.
This perspective of distrust of the United States is
remarkably similar to the emerging stance of the Chinese
leadership. Both India and China, to differing degrees, fear
105 J. Mohan Malik, 856
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an hegemonic America in the wake of the Cold War. While these
fears may or may not be justified, those fears are certainly
informing the basis of future foreign policy in both
countries. As has been examined, part of that reassessment is
manifesting itself in terms of the bolstering of both Chinese
and Indian naval capabilities. These maritime modernizations,
taken in conjunction with apprehension about American
intentions in both capitals, would suggest that both China and
India are preparing, albeit independently, for a possible
challenge to the U.S., perhaps a naval challenge, in their
respective areas of influence.
This ominous possibility taken in combination with Indian
naval expansion toward and into Southeast Asia, serves to only
raise the tension level of all the actors involved. While the
U.S has little to immediately fear from the Indian Navy, the
incremental escalation of military utilization by India, China
and Japan should give American policy makers pause.
For India, faced with complex domestic difficulties and
regional apprehension, adoption of the traditionalist's newly
defined role of "non-alignment" would clearly aid in bringing
into focus the near-term goals. With this approach, however,
India will make no progress toward easing Asian fears or
lowering regional tensions.
With the Indian Navy moving east to the Nicobar Islands,
the Chinese navy moving south and west to the Spratly and
Paracel Islands, and the Japanese navy possibly resurgent as
a result of American retrenchment, it is no wonder that the
nations of ASEAN feel as if they are caught in an
international pinchers movement, with their resource rich and
strategically pivotal region at the center of a contest they
can scarcely influence.
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IV. THE FUTURE JAPANESE NAVAL POTENTIAL
A. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES
The US-Japan relationship remains key to our Asian
security strategy. In the past, Japan's strategic
location served as a barrier to Soviet aggression; today,
US forces and Japanese Self Defense Forces maintain their
vigilance as political changes follow their course in
Russia and Northeast Asia. US forces in Japan provide for
stability throughout the region, and remain an essential
element of the deterrent against North Korean adventurism.
The continuing US presence in Japan and the strength of
the US-Japan security relationship are reassuring to many
nations as well as to Japan. : ' D
Widespread usage of the term "Pacific Century" has been in
vogue for a number of years now, and while there is a certain
amount of rhetoric that necessarily attaches itself to the
legitimate concerns raised by this idea it is clear that the
implied threat some see in this phrase is seen to be emanating
from Japan. There are indeed some global implications to this
forecast that demand close and careful scrutiny in terms of
regional and global reassessment as the dawn of the 21st
approaches
.
Of the would-be world powers, none seems to be more feared
or misunderstood throughout the region and quite possibly the
world than Japan. As a powerful island nation Japan stands




unique in the region in contrast to China and India. This
insular nature combined with immense economic prowess is
instructive in explaining some of the isolation felt within
Japan. Similar to the China, Japan is partially if not
primarily responsible for fostering the feeling of mistrust
and the atmosphere of misunderstanding that plagues Japan's
relations with its Asian neighbors.
Regional fears of Japan are largely a result of historical
animosity arising from Japanese military conduct before and
during World War II. While these events were not the
responsibility of any leaders currently in power, the
repercussions of various historical atrocities are nonetheless
sincerely felt and need to be acknowledged by Japan. 107
Intimately tied to regional and global thoughts of Japan is
the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. -Japan relationship and
how that relationship is similarly undergoing change. Asian
memories of Japanese military domination fuel the widespread
fears of a resurgent Japanese military capability independent
of the American security partnership that has existed since
the end of World War II.
Lee Kuan Yew. . .said recently that it was unfortunate that
Japan has not followed the example of Germany in being
'open and frank about the atrocities and horrors
committed' in the war. He added that because Japan did
not educate its young people about the behavior of
Japanese forces in East Asia, 'the victims suspect and
107 A.W. Grazebrook, "Maritime Potential No Cause For Concern,
"
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter , (September 1991): 27.
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fear that Japan does not think these acts were wrong, and
that there is no genuine Japanese change of heart.' 108
Widespread regional economic success and an apprehension
of the future international power structure has led many
nations within Asia to seek to improve their military
capabilities. In some instances when many smaller Asian
nations assess their respective regional security status they
come to the conclusion that they have too long neglected the
modernization of individual armed forces in concerted efforts
to develop their heretofore underdeveloped economies . The
nations of ASEAN are only now beginning to feel a genuine
sense of urgency to attain some modicum of military parity
with the larger regional powers, and the standard by which all
nations in Asia judge themselves (militarily and economically)
is without a doubt Japan.
As China and India continue to shift their respective
regional outlooks toward protecting their seaward interests,
the smaller nations within ASEAN are engaged in what some have
called a "slow motion arms race" in preparation for the
perceived period of regional uncertainty. 109
Japan has steadily improved its military capabilities
since the end of World War II while in their view carefully
:id Michael Richardson, "Regional Mistrust Increasing, " Asia-
Pacific Defence Reporter , April-May 1992, 34.
Tim Huxley, "South-East Asia's Arm's Race: Some Notes on
Recent Developments," Arms Control II, No. 1 (May 1990): 70.
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observing the spirit of the American imposed constitution.
Most importantly for this region, the Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force (MSDF) is clearly the most modern and powerful
within Asia and additionally possesses the "most sophisticated
organization in the region.... 110 "
This chapter will examine the MSDF from both a historical
and contemporary standpoint, in addition to examining recent
MSDF developments from the U.S. and Asian perspectives. By
examining the types of crafts and technological capabilities
seen in Japan's maritime acquisitions we can gain insights
into the intended uses for those weapons and hence project how
those intentions may be reflected in Japan's overarching goals
for their own foreign policy pursuits.
Within this region of narrow, heavily travelled straits
and mineral rich seabeds, a maritime force must necessarily be
the true foundation of any national military strength. The
rapid growth in terms of acquiring naval weapons systems and
vessels throughout this region would seem to affirm this
point. It is clear that even a moderate maritime force could
successfully blockade and even stop two-way trade through
these vital sea-lanes of communication (SLOC'S) ; trade that is
bound to and from not only Asia and South Asia, but also North
America, the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea.
uo Martin Douglas, "Navies of the Far East, " Naval Forces
International Forum for Maritime Power No. II, 1991: 58.
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To gain a full appreciation of the present strength and
amount of influence wielded by the MSDF one must begin with a
historical examination of the roots of the Imperial Japanese
Navy and the MSDF.
B. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE NAVY
The Japanese, it would seem, had taken to heart the advice
tendered by one of their statesmen shortly after the
arrival of Commodore Perry's ships. 'As we are inferior to
foreigners in the mechanical arts, let us , ' he urged,
'have intercourse with foreign nations and learn their
drill and methods of waging war.' 111
While the Japanese do indeed have a long and proud naval
tradition, it is only upon its stunning success in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-95) that Japan's international status as a
potential world power became truly appreciated. The
motivation for the historic Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902
was clearly founded in part by Great Britain's desire to align
itself with this emerging naval power and to maintain an
influential hand in the shifting power balance in Asia vis-a-
vis Russia and France, 11 - Through this alliance and it's
powerful maritime presence in the Pacific, Japan thus became
the first Asian power to gain a seat at the table of global
powers. Japan was seen by the west as relatively trustworthy,
Hector C. Bywater, Sea-Power In The Pacific (Boston and Ne\
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), 134.
Hisahiko Okazaki, A Grand Strategy For Japanese Defense
(New York: University Press Of America, 1986), 46.
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and more importantly, capable of maintaining order in Asia.
While not yet a full fledged member of this exclusive club,
Japan's arrival on the international scene had been nothing
short of extraordinary.
The domestic result within Japan of this meteoric rise in
Japanese global status was that the military establishment
began to assume an extremely powerful place within Japanese
domestic politics and became especially influential in terms
of foreign policy. Mikiso Hane points out that in 1897 the
Japanese military staff office was established by General
Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) . With the formation of this
office, military supreme command was henceforth effectively
placed beyond civilian control. A follow-on ordinance issued
in 1889 expanded on these powers by allowing the military
commanders to bypass even the cabinet, giving them direct
access to the Emperor in matters of military importance. 113
World War I proved to be another boon to Japanese naval
progress. At the end of the war there existed no western
nation prepared or wiling to counter the Imperial Japanese
Navy's dominance in the Pacific as their own post-war
interests remained primarily in establishing and maintaining
security within European waters and additionally, "no western
Pacific regional power was in a position to contest Japanese
Mikiso Hane, 130.
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expansion . ::4 " This allowed Japan to freely build upon both
their economic and military infrastructures largely free from
outside interference; indeed with the tacit approval of much
of the west. In retrospect, the absence of any large scale
western military presence within Asia after World War I
provided the time and opportunity for the Japanese to build
their soon to be impressive navy that would prove to be so
powerful during World War II
.
The London Disarmament Conference of 193 expanded upon
the Washington Conference's (1921-22) i: - naval vessel ratio of
3-5-5 to include heavy cruisers and a 10-10-7 ratio for light
cruisers. Hamaguchi had been attempting in vain to forge more
friendly bilateral relationships with the West (specifically
the United States) and accepted these more restrictive terms
in the interest of international cooperation, over the strong
objections of many leading Imperial Navy and military staff
officers . 1U '
114 A.W. Grazebrook, 27.
ns .. The Four power pact," otherwise known as the "Washingto
Conference," was held between November 1921 and February 1922. Th
signatories were France, Great Britain, the United States an
Japan. The "Pact" was pursued in line with the emergence of th
post-WWI Wilsonian "new diplomacy" that called for limite
disarmament and a system of multilateral treaties around the world
The distinct purpose of the "Four Power Pact" was to affect th
naval balance of power in the Pacific so that Japan could defen
itself, but not be able to wage war against the existent fleets i
the region, namely the U.S. and Great Britain. Thus the ratio o
Japanese ships to the U.S. and Great Britain was set at 3-5-5.
•'•' Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 701.
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For several reasons, the Imperial Japanese Navy also
strongly opposed the army's policy in China during the 1930 's;
first, due to its own desire to expand naval influence;
second, its desire to secure a reliable source of sorely
needed raw materials in Southeast Asia; and finally its desire
to continue strengthening the navy without drawing attention
from the west due to Japanese policies elsewhere in Asia. A
testament to growing Japanese naval bureaucratic power within
domestic politics in the years leading up to World War II was
the fact that the Hirota government in fact adopted this
policy upon the forceful demands from the navy. 117
As the navy became stronger within the Imperial
government, it fervently pushed to repeal the terms of the
1930 Disarmament Conference, and in fact the navy...
. . .used their power. . .to force Japan to withdraw from the
international disarmament system by presenting a demand
for complete naval parity that of course proved
unacceptable to the other powers at the Second London
Conference in 1935. Free from the Treaty, Japan began in
1937 a larger program of naval construction. 113
In fact it was these types of global political
developments and friction that clearly drove Japan to align
with both Germany and Italy as the 1930 's came to a close. 119
These alignments were not so much born out of ideological
117 Mikiso Hane, 267.
118 Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, 715
119 Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, 715
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compatibility with either Nazism or Fascism, but rather were
developed out of convenience and as a protest against western
treatment of Japan as a "junior partner" in the Pacific.
The apex of Japanese naval power and influence within
Japanese politics could be said to have been witnessed at
Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) . The attack was conceived by-
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku (1884-1942) . While seen as a great
victory within Japan, in retrospect it was clearly a strategic
and tactical failure. While there is some historical
speculation concerning American intervention in the war
without the attack on Pearl Harbor, it can be said with
confidence that the attack functioned not to cripple the U.S.
Pacific fleet, but rather it so enraged the nation that the
defeat of Japan was practically assured in America's mind from
the moment of the attack.
The American occupation of Japan after World War II slowly
brought back to life those aspects of Japanese political and
military structures that were deemed necessary for the
maintenance of internal order and discipline and which were
necessary to ensure eventual Japanese economic and political
self-sufficiency. The Imperial Navy was thus reborn as the
Maritime Safety Agency in May, 1948 and eventually evolved
into the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) . It may have been
given a new name, but the spirit of the Imperial Navy was
faithfully preserved.
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There is no real break between the old Imperial Japanese
Navy and the postwar Maritime Self-Defense Force, asserts
James Auer... about the only difference between the
Imperial Navy and the MSDF is that the MSDF bans drinking
on board ship.**-
This new naval force was developed by the United States in
response to the onset of the Korean War and in fact Admiral
Yamamoto was recalled to take charge of what he insisted on
calling his "small navy". This force was initially charged
with mine clearance of the many remaining World War II mines
around the waters of Japan to make passage safe for American
ships involved in the Korean conflict and to enable Japan to
resume safe maritime trade with the rest of the world."-*
At the completion of the Korean war came the signing of
the Japanese-American Security treaty in September 1951. This
treaty was soon followed by The Mutual Defense Pact of 1954
which provided for Japan to build its own self-defense force
with American money and expertise. These ideas were not
particularly attractive to the Japanese immediately after a
protracted war and occupation, but the long-run benefits of
the Mutual Defense Pact (and its various alterations) have
"*- J Staff of the Asahi Shimbun, The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese
View of Japanese American Relations (New York and Tokyo:
Weatherhill/Asahi, 1972), 196. It is interesting to note what the
Asahi Shimbun points out as the ironic birth of the Self-Defense
Forces themselves immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War
as a result of the Japanese requirement to provide what MacArthur
called a "police reserve". See page 196 for further discussion.
121 Asahi Shimbun, 197.
99
clearly benefitted the Japanese economy and the security of
its citizens . : --
The 1970 's witnessed more changes in the U. S . -Japanese
security relationship as President Nixon called on Pacific
allies to bear more of the defense burden and closed many
former U.S. bases in Japan. These events coupled with
expanding Soviet power in the Pacific made it painfully clear
to the Japanese that an increase in defense spending was
clearly required, like it or not. 1 "' Their success and speed
in rebuilding a viable military infrastructure is well beyond
western expectations and is only now coming to be fully
appreciated
.
It was only with the dawn of the 1980 ' s that the United
States truly began to witness real and genuine strides toward
Pacific region burden-sharing by Japan and Korea in addition
to the necessary result of such a demand: a rapidly growing
Japanese military. The 1980 's saw Japan assume a much greater
role in providing for its own self-defense and vowed to
protect not only its land but also vital sea-lanes. This so
called "lOOOnm Sea Lane Defense" posture has partly led to
defense spending being increased from 1% to 3% of GNP from
:" Gerald Segal, Rethinking The Pacific (Oxford: Clarendo
Press, 1990) , 242
.
123 Gerald Segal, 244
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1988 to 1991. 124 These bolder attempts toward Japanese
military autonomy, while largely under American auspices, has
contributed to regional suspicion and anxiety over this growth
in Japanese power. Lee Kuan Yew has been the most outspoken
on this issue, even criticizing the United States for pressing
Japan to build up its military capabilities in efforts to
relieve the U.S burden in Asia.
Mr. Lee also raised the issue of Japan acquiring nuclear
weapons. He said that if the Japanese were prompted to
'take the military road, they will come out on top and
this time because it is a nuclear world, it will lead to
the destruction of everything.' 1 -'
The rest of Asia would definitely prefer to see the United
States maintain a dominant and influential presence in Japan
itself. As long as the United States has troops stationed in
Japan, it is perceived that the United States would maintain
a "veto" over the use of force by any of Japan's armed forces.
By withdrawing U.S. forces from Japan, Japan would then be
free and quite possibly obliged to fend for itself militarily
and in light of its historical military reputation that
possibility alarms the rest of Asia.
lj4 Paul Beaver, ed., "JDW Country Survey: Japan," Jane'
s
Defence Weekly 17 August 1991, 282. It is interesting that this
article points out that this was the first "White Paper" in three
years to mention the Soviet threat. It seems as if that threat had
long been taken for granted, but with the thaw in U.S. -Russian
relations, Japan probably felt compelled to explain that they still
took that threat seriously.
125 Michael Richardson, "Regional Mistrust Increasing," 34.
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Of all Japan's Self -Defense Forces, the MSDF has arguably
made the most dramatic progress in rebuilding the "Imperial
Navy" from out of the ashes of World War II. It is to a
closer examination of today's MSDF that we now turn.
C. THE MSDF IN THE 1990 'S
Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is rapidly
becoming a blue water navy with the capability to project
naval power far into the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Even
without the possibility of an aircraft carrier project
this decade, the JMSDF is developing into one of the
world's top six navies with new escorts and fleet
replenishment ships. : -';'
The modernization of the MSDF is taking place within an
era of increased regional uncertainty. Throughout Asia, all
countries are carefully reassessing threats and threat levels
in terms of their own military readiness. Political and
diplomatic arrangements are taking on a more important tone as
new alliances and partnerships begin taking shape within the
ideological vacuum caused by the end of the Cold War.
While some may view military expansion as inherently
destabilizing, it is nonetheless seen as prudent, not only in
Japan, but also in the nations throughout Asia to prepare for
this uncertainty by strengthening their defensive and
offensive military capabilities. These military developments
have been by and large maritime in nature, in response to the
12 Paul Beaver, 27;
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geographical nature of the region. Any conflict in the near
future involving any East or South Asian nation would almost
certainly involve territorial or sea-lane disputes.
In the eyes of Japan there are very tangible (if partially
unrealistic to the west) threats emerging and/or persisting as
the Cold War winds down. The 1991 Japanese Defense White
Paper cited the increase in the quality if not the quantity of
Soviet equipment in the Soviet Far East as a direct threat,
and that despite the thaw in East-West tensions...
Japanese fighters have continued to intercept Soviet
combat aircraft probing the archipelago's air defence
region boundaries ... there has been no decline in the
number of intercepts as a result of the thaw in US/Soviet
relations . 1_7
The "New Mid-Term Defense Plan, " as explicated in the
"Defense of Japan 1991" 1 ':J calls for an average rate of
increase in military expenditures of 3% annually between 1991-
1995. Of that amount, the MSDF is expected to receive
approximately 24% of the total Self-Defense Force (SDF)
budget, as was the case in fiscal year 1991. 129 During this
"Mid-Term Defense Plan, " the MSDF is scheduled to obtain ten
new "Aegis" destroyers, 5 unidentified submarines, and various
127 Kensuke Ebata and Paul Beaver, "Moving Against the Flow:
Japan's Defence Build-Up, " Jane's Defence Weekly 10 August 1991,
232 .
! - s Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1991 trans, by
Japan Times, Ltd., 90.
'
:
-' Defense of Japan, 99.
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other maritime craft. The total procurement for the MSDF
during the five year time-frame will be 35 vessels
constructed, totalling approximately 96,000 tons. ljC
Additionally Japan views the increased defense
expenditures of both China and North Korea with a good deal of
trepidation. Moreover, Japan has always viewed its widely
held and extremely valuable economic interests as a matter of
national security and in the emerging era of regional doubt
they "would not sit idly by if political instability were to
threaten their long-term access to commercial markets in
Asia. :: '"
It is within the context of this explicitly defined threat
that Japan is modernizing and expanding its already impressive
naval capabilities. While clearly confident that some degree
of American military presence will continue well into the
future, Japan is nonetheless interested in moving toward a
genuine degree of military self-sufficiency while at the same
time maintaining a close working relationship with the U.S.
military, most specifically the U.S. Navy.
These facts are clear when examining recent Japanese
military expenditures. The total JSDF budget for 1992 was
$34.30 billion, an increase of $1.62 billion over 1991 132 .
13u Defense of Japan , 210.
Gene Tracey, "Japan's ' Self -Defence' Efforts," Asiar
Defence Journal June 1990, 4.
132 „ The Military Balance 1991-92," 150.
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The MSDF claimed approximately 24% of the total SDF budget,
"...39.1 per cent [of the MSDF budget] being allocated to




An examination of the capabilities and projected equipment
purchases of the MSDF shows that Japan is striving toward
improving their "blue water" maritime capabilities. 1991 saw
the completion of the first group of underway replenishment
vessels for blue water support of fleet operations.'-' 4 The
Japanese surface combatant fleet is one of the youngest in the
world in terms of hull life. The pride and joy of the surface
fleet will be the new "Aegis" type guided missile destroyer,
the lead ship in this class to be called the "Yukikaze, " named
after a fabled and revered World War II Japanese
destroyer .
'
The MSDF has developed what is called the "Eight-Eight"
Flotilla program which will provide the MSDF with four escort
flotillas of eight surface combatants each, all flotillas will
contain one of the "yukikaze class" destroyers.'-'" In
addition to the main line combatants of the flotillas, the
MSDF is ambitiously pursuing modernization of its mine warfare
133 Paul Beaver, 278.
13-4 Kensuke Ebata and Paul Beaver, 232
135 Paul Beaver, 278.
136 Paul Beaver, 278.
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and detection capabilities. Japan currently possesses six
ocean going mine countermeasure (MCM) ships and eleven (MH-
53E) Sea Dragon MCM helicopters. 1 '" These vessels caused
domestic controversy among opponents of a rearmed Japan when
they were sent to the Persian Gulf after Operation Desert
Storm to assist the Allies in clearing minefields. 13^
Of particular note in naval aviation is Japan's rapidly
expanding long-range airborne maritime patrol capability. Its
104 P-3c Orion aircraft makes Japan the third largest owner of
these planes in the world behind the U.S. and Russia. 139
These aircraft are intended for long range reconnaissance and
surveillance. They would presumably be used by Japan to warn
of any imminent strike from either the north or the west and
they provide an excellent example of growing Japanese autonomy
and self-reliance in defensive maritime warfare.
In terms of a submarine force, Japan currently possesses
17 conventional diesel-electric submarines, 10 of which have
joined the fleet just in the 1980's. 140 The early versions of
these boats were based largely on an American design, but
subsequent versions have utilized improved Japanese hull
designs and superior electronics. The submarine force is seen
Paul Beaver, 279.
A.W. Grazebrook, 28.
" Paul Beaver, 279.
140 Martin Douglas, 58.
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to provide Japan with a covert reconnaissance capability
within the narrow straits around Japan, such reconnaissance
has historically been aimed primarily at Russia. 141
The development of a light attack helicopter carrier is
seen as a possible precursor to the indigenous production of
a full-fledged aircraft carrier. This vessel could be used
for vertical take-off type aircraft, possibly British
Harriers, and it's production has caused widespread domestic
concern that this is the real first step toward an offensive
naval capability. 14 "
In addition to the actual shipbuilding and aircraft
acquisition efforts, Japan continues to proceed with intensive
research and development of future weapons systems. Much of
the new R&D is being undertaken with the aid and approval of
the U.S., occasionally leading to co-production efforts. The
recent FSX fiasco is one example that went badly. The
exchange of technology and information flows both ways across
the Pacific as the U.S. obtained agreement with Tokyo in 1986
for their cooperation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), 143 in addition to many critical technologies in
American weapon systems being produced by Japan (for example,
141 A.W. Grazebrook, 2 8
142 Martin Douglas, 59.
143 Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy,"
Asian Survey XXXI, No. 4 (April 1991), 326.
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flat screen displays) that are primarily composed of Japanese
semi-conductors .
This desire to achieve self-sufficiency permeates all
aspects of Japanese life and has a fundamental impact on how
Japan associates with the rest of the world. Part of the
explanation for this particularly Japanese characteristic lies
in the absolute reliance that Japan has on a large number of
critical raw materials for its very existence. The Japanese
have shown that they will forego the free-market concept of
comparative advantage in order to indigenously produce or grow
as many goods as possible at whatever price is required. This
eventually contributes to the high prices that the Japanese
consumer faces in purchasing many goods. When goods cannot be
produced indigenously, Japan will seek out as many friendly
suppliers around the world in order to hedge their bets and
maintain a reliable flow of these goods over time.
The people of Japan generally accept the inevitable
personal hardship brought about through these policies in
order to promote the power and self-sufficiency of the state.
Clyde Prestowitz provides some cogent insight into this subtle
and largely misunderstood Japanese trait:
Thus the Japanese lay great stress on self-sufficiency -
and do so all the more precisely because Japan knows it
cannot be self-sufficient. Most Japanese reiterate the
theme that their country is a small island nation with no
natural resources in order to rationalize and justify its
efforts to be dependent on nothing beyond natural
resources simply not available in Japan... they know the
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Japanese can be relied upon, but they are unsure of
foreigners . 144
This trait in turn stirs feelings of apprehension on the
part of other Asian countries as suspicions concerning actual
Japanese motives are inevitably raised. This suspicion is in
turn felt by the Japanese themselves and there exists a type
of vicious circle that plays itself out at the basic
subconscious level of international diplomacy and
negotiations. While these feelings can be explained away in
terms of western countries, it is difficult for other Asian
countries to be confronted with such an attitude by a country
that at a basic level they see as essentially their
"brothers .
"
The recent military and specifically maritime expansion
examined here falls directly in line with the continuation of
this concept that lies at the very heart of the Japanese
psyche. One criticism that can be made of Japan is remaining
insensitive to the impact that its military modernization has
had upon Japan's neighbors and how the United States is then
forced to address these regional apprehensions and
mispercept ions in order to maintain its own influential stance
in the region.
144 Clyde V. Prestowitz, jr., Trading Places: How We Are Giving
Our Future to Japan And How To Reclaim It (New York: Basic Books,
Inc. , 1988) , 209.
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D. AMERICA AND ASIA EYE JAPAN
The U . S . -Japanese relationship is fundamental to the
future of America's position in Asia. Given Japan's large
and ever-increasing economic presence throughout the
region, the United States cannot hope to exercise
constructive leadership without a healthy and harmonious
relationship with Japan. Few things are as unsettling to
other Asians as evidence of dysfunction in U. S . -Japanese
relations . . . :4C'
Quite possibly one of the most difficult and sensitive
issues facing the United States is how it will manage the
inevitable change in its working relationship with Japan. The
world and more specifically the nations of Asia are watching
closely as this reassessment begins to take shape.
Japan has legitimate and genuinely felt threats. The
resolution of the northern territories issue with Russia would
provide an important step in this direction and the United
States should take an active and enthusiastic role in ensuring
that this problem is promptly solved. Japan and the United
States share concern over North Korea, and the U.S. Defense
Department remains extremely wary of Korean tensions boiling
over into a violent regional confrontation.
The fact is, that when looking around Asia, many of
Japan's concerns are indeed similar to those of the United
States. The United states, if it is wise, will pursue a
balanced and careful approach in the region thereby serving to
145 Stephen W. Bosworth, "The United States And Asia, " Foreigr
Affairs 71, No. 1 (1992): 113.
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meet the concerns not only of Japan, but also of America's
friends and allies around the rest of Asia.
The issue of burden sharing by the Japanese is currently
being argued, but it is clear that Japan's share of the costs
of stationing U.S. troops on Japanese soil has been steadily
increasing as demands from the United States have slowly
brought this issue to the fore. As mentioned earlier, the
nations around Asia prefer to see the United States remain
actively involved not only throughout the waters of Asia but
specifically stationed in Japan to provide a type of leash on
any Japanese military actions.
The United States must be careful in its pursuit of the
burden sharing issue. As can be seen from the thrust of this
thesis, Japan is more than capable of arming itself if it
becomes necessary. While it would clearly prefer to let the
United States take the lead in Japanese defense, it would be
a mistake to think that they would maintain this position
regardless of U.S. pressures on their continuing efforts to
meet U.S. stationing costs:
Shun] i Taoka, staff writer for 'Business Tokyo', noted in
the March 1990 issue. . . 'Are we getting a free ride? Japan
will spend US$2.5 billion this fiscal year for the US
forces stationed here. That is more than the Science and
Technology Agency's (Tokyo) budget of US$2.5 billion. It
works out to US$51,710 for each of the 49,700 American men
and women assigned here... We contribute more than 40 per
cent of the total price tag for US forces. If Japan were
to knuckle under to Senate demands, it would cost the
111
taxpayers almost as much as the US$6.83 billion we spend
on our own navy. 14 "
Japan is playing all sides of the game in the age old
effort to cover all its bets. In the final analysis Japan
feels itself alone in the world. It has been said that before
the birth of the U.S. relationship after World War II, that
Japan never really had an ally. It could be said that they
still do not have one. The very nature of Japanese society
and politics would sometimes seem to preclude mutual trust and
breed suspicion.
The current military buildup and most specifically the
rapid growth in Japanese naval power would seem to affirm the
fact that Japan is preparing for an era where possibly they
become possibly dispossessed of their long-time protector and
find that they have to fend for themselves in the Pacific
Century
.
140 Gene D Tracey, 14. Japan now pays for over 50% of the
stationing costs for U.S. troops, but it would be foolish to thin*
that this number has no ceiling and that ceiling is not rapidly
being approached.
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V. ASEAN NAVIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
A. OVERVIEW OF PREVAILING CONCERNS
. . .with the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the phased reductions of U.S. forces in the
Asia-Pacific area, and improved relations with Indo-China
and China, ASEAN feels the time has come to deal with
regional security problems in a more active
way. . . .and. .
.
(has) recognized that economic growth in the




The nations that compose the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) 148 are faced with the similar dilemma
confronting other peripheral players in the Cold War as U.S.-
Russian tensions have receded, namely: what is the emerging
international order and power structure going to look like,
and who will be the dominant players affecting that structure,
and where will these peripheral players fit in?
The extensive speculation of the impending "Pacific
Century" is a genuine concern for these smaller Asian nations.
These countries fully realize that in the future not only will
economic power be important, but absent the East-West
struggle, the strength of a nations military will need to be
147 Michael Richardson, "ASEAN Opts for Closer Security Ties,"
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (April-May 1992): 32.
143 ASEAN was founded in 1967 and is composed of the following
nations: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand.
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commensurate with the amount and scope of the economic
interests individual nations will need to defend.
While it may be true that the degree of economic influence
a nation wields may supplant military prowess as the central
factor holding sway in the course of international affairs, it
is still the case that any nation which is strong economically
but unable to adequately preserve and defend those interests
will not be taken as seriously as a nation which has a more
prudent balance of economic and military strength.
Thoughts of a Pacific Century are generally centered upon
Japan, Korea and China, nations which are not only developing
strong economic and military structures, but also possess the
intangible but important element of political will, enabling
them to pursue an active role in the future of regional power
politics. If this prediction becomes a reality, then the
smaller nations under question may quickly be confronted with
tremendous economic, military and political challenges. As a
group of ethnically diverse and politically disparate nations,
the issue of forming a, consensus and building a functional
military and/or economic coalition may prove to be the true
test of survival for ASEAN as a viable organization.
The United States has a long Cold War heritage of active
engagement throughout the regions of South and Southeast Asia,
essentially posed as a counter-force to what was up until now
a mighty Soviet naval presence. The presence of both super-
powers led to a regional stability and status quo that has
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come to be the accepted norm by the observers and benefactors
of this stand-off.
ASEAN has prospered under the U.S. security umbrella,
which one Southeast Asian official describes as 'benign in
intent and stabilizing in influence'. Although the U.S.
appears set to maintain a military presence in the region,
it will be on a substantially reduced scale. This has
raised concerns among some ASEAN leaders that a power
vacuum v/ill be created. . .with unpredictable results. 14 '
With thoughts of a declining Soviet fleet and a voluntary,
if partial, withdrawal of U.S. naval forces from Asia, all
nations in this area are being forced to reassess their
individual security needs and reevaluate their own standing in
a region possibly dispossessed of an intervening and
protective military/maritime force. This issue is articulated
by Michael Richardson when he notes that the recent ASEAN
summit stressed the employment of military and security
cooperation as means of addressing regional as well as intra-
associational difficulties in efforts "...to avoid military
misunderstandings and a flare-up of territorial
disputes. . . . 15 °"
By the same token, it is clear that there is more at work
than an uncertainty as to the future power structure of the
region. There lies at the base of this regional coalition a
:4< Robert Karniol, "Regional Self-reliance in ASEAN,"
International Defense Review (February 1991): 126.
150 Michael Richardson, "ASEAN Opts for Closer Security Ties,"
32 .
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shared sense of apprehension concerning the other partners'
aspirations on a regional and global scale. Until now those
apprehensions were largely unspoken since any individual
attempts to expand politically or militarily would probably
have been met with international disapproval and possible
censure by its heretofore protective allies.
Additionally, until recently, these nations' respective
economic situations, by and large, might have proved too
delicately balanced to withstand this type of international
disagreement or to weather the storm of full fledged regional
conflict. This concern is very much on the minds of all the
ASEAN leaders as they currently strive to intervene and assist
in resolving disputes not only between ASEAN members, but also
other Asian neighbors with interests and disputes within the
territory covered in part by ASEAN (Spratly Islands and
Cambodia are two examples)
.
At the recent NAM summit in Jakarta, the ASEAN leaders
were careful to point out that ASEAN was not and should not
become a "military alliance." 151 Intervention in terms of
diplomatic and negotiation assistance was offered, however, as
a means to possibly settling regional disturbances such as the
Spratly Islands dispute.
Admiral Soedibyo [Chief of the General Staff of the
Indonesian Armed Forces] said China, Russia, Vietnam and
Laos could also be brought into the regional security
151 Michael Richardson, 34.
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dialogue by attending meetings that take place immediately
after the annual conference of ASEAN foreign
ministers ... .The Spratly dispute, he added, may be one
problem _ that could be addressed in this forum in the
future
.
The mutual cooperation and economic success enjoyed by
these countries is praiseworthy; however, it is important to
remember that the cultural, religious, and political
differences that clearly set these nations apart have been a
deep seated and integral part of their respective societies
for considerably longer than this grouping has been in place.
Indeed the economic affluence that has been achieved by some
(by no means all) of the nations of ASEAN has come about as a
result of individual national initiatives and cannot be
credited to any kind of shared objective or unified approach
by ASEAN itself. It is within the current international
situation that the many and varied cultural differences and
varied perceptions of national interest that set these nations
apart may come to have a direct impact upon the shifting
regional power structure.
Nonetheless, the immediately acute and explicitly
identified concern of these countries is the potential rise of
regional super-powers, namely: Japan, China, and India.
-
:
The Cold War status quo was seen by the countries of ASEAN as
providing a restraint upon these Asian giants. Forever wary
152 Michael Richardson, 34.
1
.
53 Michael Richardson, 124
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of outside attack and annexation, the nations of ASEAN are
clearly concerned that the end of the Cold War will find them
helpless against these mighty neighbors. The manifestation of
these rising fears is the seemingly gradual buildup of
military forces being undertaken by these nations. These new
forces are largely maritime, or at least designed for maritime
conflict. With the continental threat apparently diminished,
these countries are rapidly transferring their military
efforts toward fortifying their individual maritime defensive
and offensive capabilities.
This chapter will attempt to examine the ascension of the
ASEAN countries both economically and militarily, with the
exception of Brunei 154 . This chapter concentrates on intra-
ASEAN relationships in addition to ASEAN' s transforming
regional security position. Toward this end, it explores the
build up of arms that the individual countries within ASEAN
have undertaken, specifically, the maritime forces.
With the impending changes to basic international security
arrangements, it would seem clear that a fresh assessment of
the possible roles that ASEAN may assume or fail to assume in
defining those arrangements would be appropriate.
154 Brunei, while an extremely wealthy nation, has a very small
military force, and neither desires nor wields much political clout
within the region.
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B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL FRICTION
ASEAN was founded in 1967 as an association dedicated to
the economic development and political security of its member
nations. With the full support of the United States, it has
evolved into a strong and reliable ally within Southeast Asia
for the United States in what was the Cold War maritime stand-
off with the Soviet Union. A corollary development of this
superpower presence is one enjoyed by all of Asia, namely: an
environment of relatively stable regional security, allowing
these less developed nations to concentrate on domestic
economic development while not having to be overly concerned
with military growth.
The United States has been an enthusiastic supporter of
ASEAN since its inception. The superb economic growth that
has been witnessed in some of these nations has drawn
accolades around the world as a model for economic
development . It would seem clear that with the end of the
Cold War that had accompanied this relative economic
prosperity, a necessarily protective and cautious approach to
expanding their regional power base will be attempted by the
nations of ASEAN, combined with a dynamic pursuit of
strengthened diplomatic ties with western nations whose
interests fall in line with those of the individual member
states
.
The economic achievements realized by these nations in a
relatively short time is quite impressive indeed. It is
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largely the existence of an environment of relatively stable
security throughout this region that has allowed these nations
to be able to pursue their goal of economic prosperity. That
security in turn has undoubtedly been reliably preserved by
the continual presence of the U.S. military, specifically, the
U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy was on station to ensure that the
vital SLOC's in the region remained open and that any minor
conflict remained localized so as not to result in horizontal
escalation within the Cold War context.
The continuing interest and desire on the part of the
United States to remain actively engaged as a vigorous trading
partner with the nations of ASEAN while continuing to maintain
a security presence in the region can be observed in the
following statement by former Secretary of State James Baker:
ASEAN today is America's fifth largest trading partner,
rivaling U.S. commerce with Germany; and America is
ASEAN' s largest export market. ASEAN was a leader in
launching the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and we look to
ASEAN for support in successfully completing the current
negotiations. We have worked hard to keep ASEAN at the
core of our efforts at regional economic integration, and
we will continue to do so.... The base-access agreement
reached earlier this year with Singapore is a reflection
of our commitment to sustaining a defense capability in
Southeast Asia- as well as of the region's widespread
desire for an active U.S. security presence. : ' c
The resounding economic growth witnessed in this region
has resulted in concentrated efforts by some western countries
:
-- James A. Baker III, "America in Asia: Emerging Architectur
For A Pacific Community," Foreign Affairs , 70, No. 5 (Winte
1991/92) : 13-14.
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to ensure that these recently burgeoning economies remain open
and friendly to the west, and in turn these western nations
have begun to actively pursue the formation of organized
economic alliances designed to strengthen their own economic
interests within this region. This ironic development is seen
by the nations of ASEAN as an unprecedented opportunity to
forge concrete and tangible alliances on an equal partnership
basis with nations whose interests mesh at least reasonably
with their own.
The formation of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) , while initially causing some consternation on the part
of the core nations of ASEAN, is now seen to be a successful
result of this surge of international interest in ASEAN. APEC
was originally proposed in 1979 and has since gained momentum,
culminating in its official organization in November 1991.
APEC consists of the ASEAN states plus the U.S., Australia,
Japan, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, China, and Hong Kong.
This organization is dedicated to opening up world markets and
is strongly opposed to other economic groupings (EC, NAFTA)
forming regional trading blocs which may foster isolation and
an inward looking attitude. APEC ' s future is seen to be
dependent on the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations,
which will hopefully decide the critical matter of endorsing
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The nations of ASEAN were originally apprehensive of APEC,
concerned that their own regional interests would be
overshadowed by the injection of global interests by the other
larger members of the Cooperation. They insisted that
leadership in APEC be retained by a nation within ASEAN, and
this condition has been agreed upon. 157 ASEAN, led by
Malaysia, had earlier been attempting to form an "East Asia
only" economic grouping (the "East Asia Economic Caucus") that
would exclude the U.S., Australia and Canada. This attempt
was predictably opposed by these countries as fostering just
the type of regionalism that APEC (and GATT) was trying to
avoid. This move has effectively been stalled upon the
sanctioning of APEC.
These events point to the powerful place in the
international structure that the ASEAN nations are beginning
to assume. As an example, in reference to the "Asia only"
proposal, former Secretary of State Baker was quick to assert
that "America's future lies across the Pacific", and U.S.
officials were careful to affirm their commitment that ASEAN
lSb Clayton Jones, "Asia-Pacific Group Calls For Open Trade,'
The Christian Science Monitor , 15 November 1991.
1S7 Research Institute For Peace and Security, Asian Security
1990-91 (London, Oxford: Brassey's (UK), 1990), 156-57
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remain the "core of APEC." 15£ Asian, as well as ASEAN fears
of NAFTA and the EC evolving into exclusive trading blocks
poses a challenge to the U.S. American leaders must be
careful to reassure Asia that the U.S. does not desire to
exclude any nation, but rather it advocates the inclusion of
all free-market oriented societies into the world economy.
Within this sphere of international relations and economic
affairs the nations of ASEAN present a generally united and
cooperative voice. While this appearance is not necessarily
a facade, there are some aspects of intra-ASEAN conflict that
need to be understood to attain a full understanding of the
complex regional relationships that directly effect the
regional power structure and the independent policies pursued
by individual nations within the Association. It is within
the context of these complex and often contentious
relationships that growing worldwide concern over the recent
display of military growth can be observed.
At the ASEAN core- the Indonesian, Singapore, Malaysian
triangle- irritants abound. It is here especially where
Chinese race and ethnicity directly interfaces with Malay
and Indonesian, that cultural discord reinforces highly
visible economic differentiation. 1 " 9
158 Clayton Jones, 2.
1S9 Dr. Donald Weatherbee, "Changing Parameters for ASEAN
Security in the 1990 's, " in Dora Alves, ed. Change, Interdependence
and Security in the Pacific Basin. The 1990 Pacific Symposium
(Washington D.C.: National University Press, 1991), 288.
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At the heart of ASEAN' s regional anxieties is the cultural
mixture and ethnic combinations that were alluded to in the
above quotation. The nations of ASEAN arose from a common
Indie (Hindu) cultural heritage with the exception of
Singapore, who, alone in the group, arose within the otherwise
pervasive Chinese cultural influence that dominated mainland
Southeast Asia up until the 20th century. This fact, in and
of itself, sets Singapore apart from her partners in the
association. Combine the fact that Singapore is extremely
small geographically, and rather powerful economically, and
the formula adds up to potential conflict. Additionally, the
20th century has witnessed the emergence of a myriad of racial
and cultural mixtures being assimilated into these already
complex societies. These tensions have manifested themselves
in various but not always overtly contentious ways.
The territorial waters of the South China Sea have long
been an area under dispute. Many nations in the area have
staked claims in and around this strategically important
maritime zone. Rich in mineral, natural gas and petroleum
deposits, it also borders the easiest and safest worldwide
maritime passage into the Indian Ocean and points west. Most
recently China has begun to aggressively pursue its claims to
the Spratly Islands and various areas of the Gulf of Tonkin.
Both the Philippines and Malaysia claim territorial rights to
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these waters, with Thailand and Indonesia making overlapping
claims to areas held by some or all of these players. lbC
The ability of ASEAN to peacefully and successfully reach
a settlement on this issue will be a true test of regional
commitment and dedication to future growth. The development
of an ASEAN Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) would undoubtedly
help to resolve such territorial conflicts within ASEAN, but
this issue has not been actively pursued and of course do not
address the Chinese issue.
Within these nations there is a growing tide of
nationalism and economic differentiation that is beginning to
manifest itself in calls for increased pluralism. All of
these nations, as older authoritarian, market-oriented
societies, may be moving closer to parliamentary democracies
of some variation. While these feelings of nationalism have
undoubtedly been present for some time, it is only with the
easing of Cold War tensions that these feelings are being
overtly expressed. The sense is that there is no single
dominant regional power, any longer and that this diffusion of
power clearly necessitates the emergence of one or more
nations as the dominant force. The only question to be
answered is who will assume that role. Again, it will only be
through careful negotiation within the ASEAN framework that a
mutual appreciation and understanding among these nations will
160 Young Whan Kihl, 601.
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be reached. Whether ASEAN is capable or willing to act on
these issues is a problematic issue at best.
The diplomatic and political alliances that individual
ASEAN nations pursue unilaterally is an additional cause for
mtra-associational misunderstanding. Objections to such
extra-ASEAN alliances are largely cloaked in the ambiguous
label of "non-alignment", and many nations address any overt
or full fledged cooperation with "aligned" countries as
detrimental to ASEAN' s greater aims. For example, Malaysia
was initially apprehensive about Singapore allowing the U.S.
to increase its naval presence at Singapore and subsequently
agreeing to allow U.S. ships docking and indeed full scale
services at their ports. 161
While this type of objection is ostensibly raised in the
interest of maintaining regional security and mutual trust, it
in fact points clearly to the larger theme of this thesis.
The nations of ASEAN are slowly becoming involved in a battle
for regional dominance and prestige, with the formation of
legitimate international, alliances, outside of the context of
ASEAN, seen to be a critical feature in strengthening that
position
.
This associational and regional competition is beginning
to manifest itself in the form of the regional arms race
examined throughout this thesis. The wide variety of complex
161 Sheldon W. Simon, "United States Security Policy an
ASEAN," Current History , 89, No. 545 (March 1990): 100
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relationships in terms of overlapping disputes, ill-defined
alliances of convenience and long standing ethnic disputes
serves to generate the impetus for this buildup and is only
aggravated by what is seen as ambiguity concerning the future
role of the U.S. military in what has been a traditional
function of regional balancer. In the unique case of ASEAN,
military arms have largely been provided by western nations
(primarily the United States) who have long held interests in
this region, leading to an additional regional concern as to
the future of ASEAN' s heretofore concessional arms deals.
It is to an examination of the naval capabilities and
current naval buildup within ASEAN to which we now turn.
C. THE GROWTH OF ASEAN MILITARIES
...there has been what amounts to a slow motion arms
race ... involving most of the ASEAN states over the last
two decades, motivated to a notable degree by 'non-threat
factors'- especially military and national prestige and
status- but also 'supplier pressures' from the defense
industries of the U.S. and Europe. lbJ
ASEAN has never been, nor was it intended to be, a
military alliance. Over the years there have been limited
attempts at forging associational security arrangements
resulting in varying degrees of success. Malaysia initiated
the concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) in 1971, in an effort to establish a "nuclear-free
162 Tim Huxley, 7 .
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zone" within Southeast Asia. lb3 This effort has been seen as
another attempt at the reaffirmation of "non-alignment" but
has never been taken seriously by the majority of ASEAN
nations, and the western powers have shown little desire for
this type of contingency. The problem facing the nations of
ASEAN today is that their rationale for "non-alignment,"
similar to India, has quite possibly been overcome by events,
i.e., the end of the global struggle between democracy and
communism.
The individual nations of ASEAN are independently pursuing
the development of their own militaries completely independent
of the structure of ASEAN, which in fact has no real authority
to control military growth within ASEAN, and indeed whose very
mission is quite obviously in a process of redefinition. It
is this degree of uncertainty over the future role and
effectiveness of ASEAN that in part is leading to regional
apprehension which in turn acts as another factor serving to
fuel the "mini arms race."
...the fact is that there is no evidence of any
cooperation in arms purchasing by the ASEAN governments,
despite the clear cost-saving benefits that European NATO
members have secured in this way. lb4
lb3 Richard Tanter, Nuclear-Free Zones as a Demilitarizatior
Strategy , in "Asia: Militarization And Regional Conflict," ed.
Yoshikazu Sakamoto (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.) , 198-99.
164 Tim Huxley, 70 .
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While these individual nations reassess their respective
regional security positions, so do the arms suppliers of the
west. Within the rapidly changing global structure, only
economic capability and the willingness of supplier countries
to ship arms to the ASEAN states will stand in the way of
military growth. While the ongoing communist and ethnic
insurgencies in the Philippines, Cambodia and Burma as well as
other low visibility regional conflicts may give these nations
some leverage in requesting western assistance, these reasons
are clearly not so compelling as the Soviet counter-balance
rationale that was used for so many years. In fact,
concerning the present arms buildup within ASEAN, it looks as
though its every man for himself, with each country pursuing
its own goals determined largely by the ability/willingness to
pay and the perceived regional threats.
There is a common historical factor, however, present in
the purchasing characteristics of ASEAN arms imports. A large
proportion of arms in each of these countries have been
imported from the United States. The United States has been
actively exporting arms to some or all of these nations
throughout the Cold War and it is clear that some of these
nations rely heavily upon U.S. arms for the viability of their
armed forces (see Table 1)
.
While the Clinton administration may make attempts at
cutting back on large scale U.S. arms sales around the world,
there is currently no reason to think that the trend of arms
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sales from the west to paying customers will not continue.
The difference in this region in the future will lie in the
fact that the split between the economic "haves" and "have-
nots" will begin to clearly manifest itself in terms of modern
military capabilities, giving the economically advanced
countries a distinct advantage over the less well off nations
who now possess little or no leverage in attracting
concessional arms sales guarantees. With the perception of
waning U.S. interests in the region, this situation points to
a future of regional instability leading to low-intensity
conflict, almost certainly maritime in nature.
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TABLE 1
U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS TO S.E. ASIA
CUMULATIVE ARMS IMPORTS % OF TOTAL






SINGAPORE 900 7 9%
THAILAND 1000 67%
Source: U.S. Arms Control Agency. World Military
Expenditures And Arms Transfers 1989 . Washington D.C.: GPO,
1990.
131
Table 2 examines the naval capabilities of the individual
ASEAN nations in terms of major maritime assets. The trend in
the region has been to acquire arms, maritime or otherwise,
that would aid in fighting some type of, as yet undefined,
maritime conflict.
Table 2 points out some intriguing aspects of the various
navies and there individual capabilities. Indonesia is
clearly the superior navy in terms of absolute volume, and it
is the only navy within ASEAN that possesses a submarine
capability. The Malaysians have been trying to negotiate a
agreement for the purpose of developing their own submarine
project, but have been apprehensive about purchasing
commercially fitted Porpoise-class submarines from the
British, desiring to follow their own domestic development
program. lfeC
The Indonesians are also said to be interested in
purchasing additional submarines to complement the two in
service, but those have been held up for funding
considerations. In terras of power projection, it has recently
been reported that Indonesia is in the process of refitting
the former British underway replenishment (unrep) oiler "Green
Rover." While primarily an unrep vessel, it will also be
lb5 J.V.P. Goldrick, "The Century of the Pacific," Nava
Institute Proceedings (March 1991): 64.
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TABLE
THE ASEAN NAVIES (1992)*
SUBS FRIGATES PATROL MINE WARFARE** AMPHIBS
SINGAPORE 32




* Does not include recent acquisitions by RMN of 2 frigates
being built in the U.K. and the transfer of 35 "Parchim" class
corvettes from Germany to Indonesia.
** Includes mine-countermeasure (MCM) and mine-laying vessels
.
Source: "The Military Balance of Power 1991-92," Published by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies , Director,
Francois Heisborg, London. October 1991.
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capable of operating but not embarking helicopters of "Super
Puma" size. 1"
The Singaporean Navy, while not as numerically impressive
as Indonesia, has the newest navy and because of that the most
effective and technically advanced force. Complementing
Singapore's modern maritime forces are the most
technologically advanced shipbuilding facilities among the
ASEAN nations and indeed all of Asia. Singapore has in fact
built and exported ships for the other nations of ASEAN as
well as her own navy.
Singapore is the centre of the ASEAN naval shipbuilding
industry, Singapore yards have supplied most recent new
construction for the Singapore navy... The current pattern
is for the lead-ship in the class to be built outside
Singapore with subsequent hulls built under license. . .Much
of the Singapore navy is new, with the result that current
construction plans are limited. lc,?
Close cooperation with Israel has led to the purchase of
the hull design for Singapore's newest Corvettes (fast-attack
patrol boat) , which possess a good deal of Israeli technology,
specifically electronic, equipment. Singapore currently owns
6 of these "Victory-class" corvettes. These fast-attack boats
possess 8 harpoon surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's), and
when combined with Singapore's current inventory of 6 French
5 Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (June -July 19 92) : 25
167 Stuart Slade, "Naval Construction In The ASEAN Area, " Nava!
Forces International Forum For Maritime Power XII, No. VI (1991)
22 .
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Sea wolf-class fast-attack boats each with 2 Harpoon and 2
Gabriel missile systems, their coastal patrol capability is
quite advanced.'-""3 Additionally, Singapore's newest maritime
enterprise has led to negotiations with the Swedish in efforts
to acquire four new "Landsort" minesweepers. 169
The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) is a fairly well balanced
and capable force centering on their 2 modern German-built
light frigates of the Kasturi class (helo-deck and 2 Exocet
SSM's) . They also possess an impressive patrol-craft
capability with 8 "Exocet" armed missile craft and 29 offshore
patrol craft . 170
In terms of modernization, Malaysia has recently come to
terms with GEC-Marconi UK for the purchase of two frigates,
originally planned as fast-attack boats, but upgraded to
frigate size for strategic purposes. These vessels, when
delivered within four years, will significantly upgrade the
blue-water capability of the RMN. They will carry "Exocet"
surface-to -surface missiles, electronic warfare and
antisubmarine warfare systems, as well as Vertical Launch
Seawolf anti-missile system. They will also be capable of
embarking and operating advanced helicopters. 1 ' 1
163 „ The Miii tary Balance 1991-92," 153.
16Q Stuart Slade, 21-22.
no „ The Miii tary Balance 1991-92," 149.
171 Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (June-July 1992): 31
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The Royal Thai Navy has been the last to enter the arena
of regional naval development. Current plans call for modern
frigates to be supplied by the Chinese to complement or
replace the 6 already in operation 17 -. Interestingly, the Thai
government is working hard at improving its amphibious
capability by pursuing the upgrading of their already
impressive amphibious potential to include the expansion to
the divisional manning level. 173
Thailand currently possesses 6 U.S. built LST's capable of
holding 200 troops and 16 tanks and two 300 troop former
French LST's in addition to a number of smaller amphibious
craft. 1
"
4 In addition to these acquisitions, the RTN is said
to be acquiring a 13,000 ton ramped deck, vertical take-off
(VSTOL) aircraft carrier. The vessel will be capable of
embarking 12 Harrier "jump jets" or "Sea King" size
helicopters. Most importantly in terms of power projection
capabilities, the carrier will have a 12 knot range of 10,000
nautical miles. 17 -'
The Philippines have by far the most outdated and
ineffective maritime force. Their frigates are third hand,
passed down from the United States through the South
172 „ The Military Balance 1991-92," 154.
Stuart Slade, 22.
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"The Military Balance," 154.
175 Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (August-September 1992) : 22
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Vietnamese. Additionally, their training is inadequate and
limited financial capital has led to cutbacks where
improvements should have been made. Current plans for
upgrading the Philippine maritime force is centered around the
acquisition of improved fast-attack patrol boats. The
completion of these plans is seen as "highly questionable" and
in fact the navy is seen as "...utterly inadequate to match
the demands placed upon it. 176 "
It is clear that the nations within ASEAN, with the
notable exception of the Philippines, are proceeding on a
generally multi-lateral maritime renovation. Additionally,
they all seem to be forming their maritime forces around a
perceived threat and improving their capabilities to meet that
threat. Arriving at a clear definition of this threat will
remain a difficult task for the countries of ASEAN.
The fact remains, however, that the countries of ASEAN are
preparing for an era of perceived increased regional tension.
In line with the observable trend in arms purchases and
maritime construction, the perceived threat would seem to be
primarily maritime in nature. The prevalence of fast-attack
coastal patrol craft combined with upgraded amphibious
capabilities indicates the importance of protecting the
various islands that make up much of the territory in question
as well as protection of long stretches of vulnerable
176 Stuart Slade, 20.
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coastline from covert incursion as strategic goals upon which
maritime and military doctrine is being formulated.
In addition to the adjacent sea-lanes, the nations within
ASEAN have to protect various offshore mineral and oil
reserves, as well as abundant fisheries. The prevention of
coastal piracy and narcotics trafficking is beginning to loom
as an added responsibility of the new maritime forces.
The importance of the geographical size and strategically
vital location of the nations of ASEAN can not be overstated.
China and India are both clearly shifting their maritime focus
toward the area occupied by ASEAN. The critical SLOC's of the
region function as the crossroads for two-way trade around the
globe. With the possibility of a diminished American presence
in Asia, and with Chines and Indian naval expansion toward
Southeast Asia, it is no wonder that the nations of ASEAN are
concerned for their own security. The addition of a
militarily resurgent Japan (which already has a commanding
economic presence in Southeast Asia) into the already volatile
equation, would serve to elevate regional anxiety.
The security reassessment in ASEAN is, and will continue
to take place concurrently with the build-up of arms; a policy




VI. THE AMERICAN PRESENCE CONTEMPLATED
U.S. PRESENCE IN ASIA: FROM COLD WAR TO PEACE DIVIDEND
Someone - an American - has been lying for almost 50 years
on a procrustean bed, with a big gun under his pillow and
eyes trained on the window, through which a Soviet
intruder might burst in. Today, as he is getting up from
that bed, he discovers a Soviet in the room, but with an
olive branch; he also notices that there are many other
people all around him, that his gun is of little use in
the crowd, and that the furniture has been rearranged. A
bit dizzy, he congratulates himself on apparently having
deterred any break-in, but he finds it difficult to make
sense of the changes and the bustle, and he experiences
some painful bedsores. 177
This graphic and rather humorous portrayal of the United
States in the post-Cold War era is actually quite concise in
its assessment of the murky perspective for future U.S.
foreign policy as well as that of many nations around the
world. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States is
holding a double-edged sword of both power and responsibility.
This chapter examines the U.S. military presence in Asia
and assesses the development of American regional interests as
they have evolved throughout the duration of the Cold War. It
argues that a new rationale has emerged for the maintenance of
a future presence in this region as the veil of East-West
177 Stanley Hoffman, "A New World Order and Its Troubles," in
Nicholas Rizopoulos, ed . "Sea Changes: American Foreign Policy in
a World Transformed," (New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Press, 1990) , 274.
139
conflict has been removed from the context of relations in the
region. The chapter concludes with a careful examination of
the scope of engagement this continued presence might and
should assume.
The complexity and global ramifications of U.S. -Soviet
competition as it effected the sum of international relations
in the past forty-five years is reflected in the early words
of George Kennan, written in his famous "Mr. X" article in
July of 1947
:
The issue of Soviet -American relations is in essence a
test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation
among nations. To avoid destruction, the United States
need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove
itself worthy of preservation as a great nation. 173
What is clear above all else from this quotation is the
genuine sense of urgency and purpose that the United States
felt in contending with and containing the spread of
Communism. The United States was clearly then, as now, the
only nation both willing and capable of leading and meeting
that challenge. This confrontation called for
economic/military strength and resiliency as well as the
political will and public resolve to meet the inherent demands
of sacrifice. As important, there were many nations around
the world who quite clearly looked to the United States to
ns „ x
^
„ "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs , 25,
No. 4 (July 1947) : 582.
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assume this mantel of responsibility and to protect them from
what they saw as the scourge of Communism.
Of course, in successfully avoiding a major, possibly
apocalyptic confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United
States put itself in the paradoxical situation where it now
has to periodically justify in hindsight its efforts at
avoiding that confrontation. There will always be those who
will say that the very preparation for conflict, most notably
the nuclear arms race, only perpetuated the struggle and that
the Cold War would not have been waged as long and as bitterly
had the U.S. been more willing to accommodate the Soviet
Union
.
While resolution of that argument is best left to others,
the victory of the United States in that struggle is as
unequivocal as the obscure international power structure that
has evolved in the aftermath of the Cold War. The noticeable
worldwide tension concerning the manifestation of a "new world
order" would seem to demand that American leaders promptly
revisit the foundations and operational principles of U.S.
"Grand Strategy.
"
Charles William Maynes conducts an scholarly examination
of this issue in his Foreign Affairs article "America without
the Cold War." 17Q He posits that the coming debate concerning





American foreign policy will intimately involve the American
public as no such matters ever have.
The choices for America are, he feels, rather clear. The
United States can take advantage of its status as world
superpower and continue to wield international influence at
some gain and considerable cost, or it can retrench into a
quasi-isolationist mode in which national interests are
closely held and strictly defined. While the choices may seem
clear cut, the probable long term results of either course of
action are what lies at the heart of the current debate within
American leadership circles.
A foreign policy based on a desire to export democracy
might enhance American power in the short run, but it
could lead to acting with arrogance abroad that might be
dangerous in the long run. A foreign policy based on a
global partnership could bring cooperative efforts in the
best interests of the American people, but it would come
at a cost . The two patterns of diplomacy Americans have
known are isolationism and preeminence. Either maximizes
America's ability to decide its fate alone. Will
Americans be comfortable with an approach that requires
them to allow others a voice in America's future? ld!
The indeterminate period during which the shape of that
strategy is being defined is quite likely to be the most
precarious and uneasy phase of the early post-Cold War era.
As the world's dominant actor in terms of overall economic,
military, and political influence, the nations of the world
will most certainly be watching as the United States strives
180 Charles William Maynes , 25
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to clarify and redefine its foreign policy goals and
interests. They will then likely gauge their own reactions to
global developments at least in part upon the reactions of the
United States, regardless of whether they are in agreement or
disagreement with U.S. policies.
In sum, future U.S. actions concerning foreign policywill
take on a new meaning. No longer will the military and
security rationale be the primary mover and factor in
determining those policies, rather it will be a varying mix of
economic and security considerations that will drive foreign
policy. That fact taken in conjunction with the growing U.S.
dependence on the world economic marketplace, would seem to
render Maynes ' query moot .
Other parts of the world already have an influence over
U.S. foreign policy; that is indeed the very nature of the
"new world order." The U.S., as the sole remaining super
power, will serve as the weather vane for the rest of the
world. Therefore it is critical that U.S. foreign policy be
not only carefully reassessed, but it must also be clearly
defined so that there is little ambiguity concerning where
U.S. national interests lie. It will be important for the
other nations of the world to understand from what context the
United Sates will base any military or economic actions in the
future: namely, the economic well being of the United States
and its citizens will become the standard by which any future
foreign policy decisions are based.
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Within the American domestic context, the end of the Cold
War finds U.S. leadership facing increased pressure to reduce
its Cold War defense spending and redirect those funds to more
immediate and tangible internal difficulties. The so called
"peace dividend, " taken in light of the fact that there is no
easily discernible threat to the United States, combined with
the recently narrowing perceptions of national interest on the
part of many legislators, has become a powerful arguing point
among the American public.
To many Americans facing economic hardship, Pat Buchanan
gives voice to an attractive thesis when he says,
Americans need to start asking basic questions before
barging into other people's neighborhoods, and involving
ourselves in other people's quarrels. First among them:
Why is this our problem? 181
While there is an attractive simplicity involved, there
are some undeniable factors working against this kind of
narrow and decidedly short term thinking. Particularly, the
degree to which the world's economy has become interlocked to
such an extent that national interests in the coming century
will transcend the obvious and visible military and
territorial concerns usually regarded as forming the essence
of national security.
Patrick J. Buchanan, "A Chance to Put America First, at
Last," Washington Post National Weekly Edition , September 16-22,
1991, 23.
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Charles Krauthammer takes a sobenngly realistic approach
to this issue when he asserted that the United States is
presently positioned at a short "Unipolar Moment" within which
it must assert itself around the world to maintain its status
as a superpower:
The United States is, like Britain before it, a
commercial, maritime, trading nation that needs an open,
stable world environment in which to thrive. In a world
of Saddams, if the United States were to shed its unique
superpower role, its economy would be gravely wounded.
Insecure sea-lanes, impoverished trading partners,
exorbitant oil prices, explosive regional instability are
only the more obvious risks of an American abdication...
If America wants stability, it will have to create it. 182
B. THE EVOLUTION OF ASIA'S STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
The United States first became involved in the Asian-
Pacific region for the protection of precisely the types of
economic national interests to which Krauthammer refers.
Moreover, these initial Asian encounters took place long
before the emergence of the Cold War and the principles of
containment
.
Then, as now, the primary interest in Asia for the United
States and indeed the entire world was based on the economic
benefits and riches that the region had to offer in terms of
raw materials, and in time, the opening of largely untapped
182 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment, " Foreign
Affairs, 70, No. 1 (1991): 27,29.
145
consumer markets. Indeed, it was the initial success of the
traders in the Pacific that inevitably led to the demand by
these traders that they be protected by the U.S. Navy, and the
presence of the American fleet has not vanished since. While
the Royal Navy stilled ruled the waves in this region, the
U.S. began "sporadic patrols" in the Pacific region as early
as 1820. 18i
While trade and commerce largely dictated American
interests in Asia up until World War II, it was with the
advent of modest American imperialism in the Philippines that
placed Asia squarely within the realm of significant foreign
policy concerns and thus began to demand attention from
Washington D.C. Beginning with the Philippines, and later
with Japan, Korea and the smaller nations of ASEAN, the
United States vigorously pursued the development of strong
bilateral relationships that took the form of military
assistance and protection and most importantly, economic
development and selected subsidies. While these later
alliances, formal and otherwise, were founded upon different
criteria and within different circumstances, it would seem
that the original economic value of the region and its markets
were never far from the minds of U.S. policy makers.
183 Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Ol<
China Trade to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press
1992), 14-15.
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With the emergence of the Cold War, the Asian perspective
for U.S. foreign policy shifted to a far more global and
strategic outlook. In hindsight it was necessary that the
U.S. defer the obvious benefits of strictly profit-oriented
free-trade with the region in deference to achieving the more
significant goal of fostering strong friendships. The United
States has nonetheless paid a high price for winning the Cold
War, and nowhere is this more true than in Asia.
The continuing shift of economic power to East Asian
competitors has been due in significant measure to the
single-minded American focus on security concerns in the
Asia-Pacific region. Since the Truman administration,
successive presidents have subordinated U.S. economic
interests to perceived geopolitical requirements. As the
price for their military and diplomatic cooperation, the
United States has actively promoted the economic power of
its East Asian allies. 184
This analysis strikes at the very heart of what serves as
the major point of contention in the current reassessment of
U.S. -Asian relations. Namely, further and continued military
and economic concessions are no longer practical or fair from
the American perspective, while at the same time the United
States maintains vital economic and political interests in the
region that are well served by both military presence as well
as the currently favorable economic conditions. This paradox
needs to be addressed by the United States first, and falls in
184 Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., 56
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line with the reassessment of overall foreign policy that is
taking place around the world.
To determine national interests within Asia, it is
critical that the assessment be divorced from Cold War
thinking and a recycled rationale from that era. As of 1992,
there exists no imminent threat to the sovereignty of the
United States from Asia. While China and India both possess
nuclear arsenals, the threat from those weapons pale in
comparison to the Cold War arsenal of the Soviet Union, so
that while they may be serious, they simply will not hold sway
as criteria for the maintenance of the status quo military
posture. This may be careless shortsightedness on the part of
Americans, but it appears to be the publicly held sentiments
of most of the population and many key decision makers.
Ironically, what lies at the heart of American national
interests in Asia has led back to where the relationship
started. Specifically, economic considerations are and
finally can be considered as the primary concern of the United
States within Asia. This affirmation of economics as central
to foreign policy need not be confrontational, and indeed can
take the form of economic cooperation.
The first goal of the United States must be to convince
the American people that their individual lives are somehow
effected by what occurs economically and politically within
Asia. No small task, it can only be made by carefully
explaining the facts concerning the absolute interdependence
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of the world's economy, and even to a greater extent the
economies of Asia and the United States. Statistics
concerning U.S. -Asian trade reveal the depth of this
interdependence
.
Japanese GDP growth for 1990 was 4.9%. The nations of
ASEAN averaged 7.4% GDP growth for the same period. 18 ' The
areas where this growth has been witnessed is of particular
relevance to the United States and its domestic economy.
...the prevailing pattern has entailed rapid export-led
growth, ultimately including capital-intensive industrial
development and innovation and production in high
technology .... Five of America's ten largest overseas
trading partners are Asian states. Two-way U.S. trade
with Japan is approximately three times that with Germany,
America's second-largest overseas partner ... .Japan alone
buys more from the United States than do Germany, France,
and Italy combined. .. .Only Canada surpasses Japan as a
market for U.S. goods ... .East Asia (and Japan in
particular) is at the forefront of a global revolution in
information and communication technologies, with its
imprint keenly felt in a growing array of products and
services, including U.S. weapons systems and related
defense technologies. 186
In addition to U.S. goods being exported to these
lucrative Asian markets, these countries also direct large
portions of their total exports to the U.S. In 1991, Japan
conducted 27% of its total trade with the United States.
India (13%), China (11%), and the nations of ASEAN (16%
13 = The Military Balance 1991-92," 146-154.
i8b „ A New strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension,"
Published by the Rand Corporation , Santa Monica Ca . , 1992), 20-21.
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average) showed similar signs of dependence on the American
economic market. 137
While the case can be made for global economic
interdependence can and indeed has been made by the Bush and
Clinton administrations, what needs to be addressed is to what
extent the United States is prepared to defend those
interests, especially when the danger to those interests is
ambiguous and does not overtly threaten the immediate security
and well-being of Americans.
The individual leaders around the Asia-Pacific region
watch very carefully as this reassessment is taking place
within the United States. They are frustrated in their
inability to effectively shape that policy and can only stress
the point that not only will they be hurt by widespread and
long term instability in the region, but the United States
will also feel the effects of that instability in the form of
higher prices, shortages of raw materials and finished
products, and most importantly for American workers, the
vanishing of overseas markets in which to export their goods
In an unusual statement tinged with anxiety, Prime
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan and President Roh Tae
Woo of South Korea 'agreed that a continued active United
States role is indispensable to stability in the region,
and voiced the expectation that the coming new United
States Administration will not change this policy' . . . .The
comments reflect a concern common throughout East Asia, if
little appreciated in Washington: many Asian leaders are





isolationism are making a United States pullout from Asia
inevitable.
. .
.That has raised a concern that the resulting
power vacuum could trigger a dangerous arms race. 138
What sounds at times to Americans like alarmist and
patronizing pleas, are in fact often sincere attempts at
drawing this situation more clearly for American policy
makers
.
...There is potential for instability arising from the
region's strategic and nodal location at the crossroads of
the Pacific and Indian Oceans .. .Apart from the potential
of external threats, intra-regional diversity could cause
instability. . .The United States presence in Southeast Asia
in the post Second World War period has been a major
stabilizing influence. A United States withdrawal or a
substantial scaling down of its military presence in
Southeast Asia would create a vacuum that others would
scramble to fill. 189
It is in fact the inability or unwillingness of the United
States to make clear its future intentions for the region that
may in fact be serving to heighten the level of anxiety and in
turn fuel the maritime arms buildup that this thesis has
examined. It will be helpful to examine the subtle but
discernible shift in strategic thinking that has occurred
within Asia to illustrate this point.
The strategic importance brought about by the insular
nature of this region is being borne out in the maritime
188 James Sterngold, "Japan and Korea Worry That U.S. May Pull
Out," New York Times , 9 November 1992, A5
.
189 Ambassador Jaya Mohideen, "Security Policy in Southeast
Asia- A Singapore View," Nato Review 38, No. 5 (October 1990): 28.
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planning and acquisition of arms being sought by the nations
of ASEAN as well as China, India and Japan. At first blush it
may seem odd that the countries of ASEAN do not more
aggressively endeavor to acquire more substantial "blue-water"
fleets. The truth remains however that these small nations
have no real need or desire to project maritime power far from
their shores. They have no illusions of international naval
control. They simply want to protect what they have and they
see other regional players as the only imminent threat to
their territory.
China and India, however, have designs on short to mid-
term regional leadership and are currently pursuing aggressive
naval modernization programs to that end. Japan must play a
delicate balancing act of maritime modernization within the
loosely interpreted limits of the U.S. -Japan defense treaty.
They have the capability to strike dread in the hearts of
their neighbors in much the same way China does to Malaysia
and other smaller Southeast Asian neighbors. Japan, however,
is hamstrung more than any other nation, by historical baggage
that forces them to proceed slowly and with a wary eye toward
regional reactions. Japan is well aware of the economic price
to be paid for isolating and scaring off potential investors
and markets with overly aggressive military modernization.
A more important aspect of the naval acquisitions examined
in this thesis, however, is the fact that the increases
witnessed in the procurement of fast-attack, patrol type craft
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and mine-sweepers combined with strengthened air defenses,
furnish these nations with enhanced self-defense or even
offensive capabilities within the region. While the case has
been made that Asian nations are seeking prestige through the
acquisition of sophisticated weapon systems, it is clear that
beyond that desire there is a clear vision of the intended
purpose and predicted employment of those systems in response
to the threat as envisioned, however indistinctly.
The fact remains, however, that there lingers within the
minds of many Asian leaders serious doubt concerning the
future American naval presence within the region. The above
quote from the Singaporean Ambassador to the European
Community points out this fact clearly. Indeed, future
regional prosperity is seen by some leaders as hinging on the
continued presence of the United States.
Preparations are clearly being made by the nations under
question either to repel an attack of some kind or wage an
preemptive attack with marines and amphibious craft. The
missiles carried by these coastal patrol craft and the
technology acquired with the mine-sweepers signifies a genuine
dedication to protecting the sea-lanes that are adjacent to
all these nations on at least one border. The difficulty is
that other nations could see these types of purchases as
attempts to gain the regional upper hand or indeed attempt
some kind of regional invasion or siege. It is within this
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setting of regional disquiet and apprehension that the
regional arms race is being escalated.
C. FUTURE OPTIONS FOR U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE/EMPLOYMENT
It is with an understanding of this regional context that
the United States must carefully adapt its naval strategy in
Asia. Total withdrawal, while conceivable, is not really
feasible and will most likely not be the end result of the
termination of the Cold War. Rather, the more difficult
question comes when trying to decide how much involvement,
when weighed against domestic constraints and the regional
desires for autonomy and stability.
For the United States, cooperation could be a substitute
for the reductions in U.S. global military activity. . .This
could be seen as a logical extension of the Nixon
Doctrine. Even in the Days of the 600 ship navy, the U.S.
fleet was no substitute for the basic assets other nations
with maritime responsibilities require for their own
protection . 19 °
This type of international naval cooperation would clearly
maintain the degree of stability and regional integrity that
is desired by the nations of the region and that is certainly
required by the United States. This cooperation should take
the form of short term, non-binding friendship type agreements
with the nations of not only ASEAN, but of all the nations of
190 J.V.P. Goldrick: 65.
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Asia. It would undoubtedly prove detrimental if the United
States were to slip back into the outmoded Cold War style of
thinking that required a vast array of binding bilateral
agreements that in time would not serve the interests of the
United States. This type of system tends to divide the world
into clearly defined and competing camps. The United States
must be capable and willing to leave as many options around
the world open as possible for economic growth and
development
.
As alluded to throughout this thesis, the United States
should make it clear in the post-Cold War world that its
primary concern is the national security and well-being of its
citizens (i.e., economic prosperity) and proceed to act
accordingly in the conduct of its international affairs. This
type of clear and unequivocal policy stance will both be
respected and appreciated by the rest of the world, as well as
having the corollary benefit of serving well those cooperative
and friendly trading and security partners of the U.S. around
the world.
,,
While American global commitment to the improvement of
human rights conditions, the promotion of democracy and
increased attention to environmental issues may carry some
weight in the future, it is clear that any type of
intervention will be closely scrutinized to determine its long
term and short term domestic economic benefits and costs.
While not the only criteria, this type of parochial thinking
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will certainly become a touchstone in the formation of future
U.S. foreign policy.
Fostering regional naval cooperation with the United
States acting as a leader among valued partners would also
benefit the recipient nation and more than likely additionally
foster the further purchases of U.S. naval arms, which
necessarily would require some degree of training by the
supplier nation providing an economic incentive to the U.S.
taxpayer. 1 " 1 This type of naval/military cooperation would
not only help to alleviate U.S. naval requirements, but it
would also serve to allay the fears of the Asian nations over
the perceived imminent departure of the U.S. Navy.
This is not to say that there is multi-lateral consensus
on the United States playing this type of a role. In fact, as
has been pointed out earlier, the U.S. presence, while
providing a degree of stability, has also be a point of
contention with some of the nations of ASEAN for example.
With the close relationship between the United States and the
Philippines undergoing fundamental transition, there is a good
deal of apprehension about the United States receiving greater
temporary resupply and repair privileges in the ports of
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.
Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew has been
very outspoken on this issue. He insists that the economic
191 J.V.P. Goldrick, 66
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benefits that are now being reaped by the entire region have
arisen as a direct result of the constant U.S. naval presence
within Southeast Asia. 1 '- While this issue has been resolved
for the time being, the underlying regional issues of ethnic
and cultural mistrust and suspicion have not been eliminated
and will remain a sore point for some time to come.
While these types of coalition building and cooperative
measures may provide the needed reassurance to Asian allies as
well as a degree of fiscal relief to the U.S. economy, the
question remains as to the actual scope, numbers and types of
U.S. forces that will form the remaining core of American
presence in Asia. It will be helpful to examine the
statistics as they currently apply to the region and compare
those to the region's future and to other regions around the
world, specifically Europe. The final section of this chapter
examines possible force postures and their various
implications
.
While there have been some minor drawdowns in forces up to
the time of this report, for purposes of analysis it may be
assumed that the figures in Table 3 represent the Cold War
force levels for the Pacific region. Quite clearly the navy-
carries the bulk of the burden in this region and in
conjunction with the Marine Corps (USMC) , accounts for 59% of
192 Sheldon Simon, 100
.
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the total personnel force in the region while being allotted
55% of the DOD budget for the region.
The mobility of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps (USMC) is
a valuable asset, but its worth is difficult to compare to the
traditional ground occupation and permanent presence aspects
of Army and Air forces. In terms of the Cold War rationale,
the two groups served quite different and important functions,
some of which can clearly be drastically scaled back or even
eliminated within the shifting context of post-Cold War
regional security.
As one example, the presence of U.S. Army forces on the
ground in Korea has led to the development of a long-term and
mutually beneficial political as well as economic relationship
between the two countries. While there was clearly a well
defined Cold War rationale for the maintenance of these
forces, the corollary benefits of this relationship have
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN THE PACIFIC (MARCH 1990)
BRANCH # OF PERSONNEL' TOTAL COST*
ARMY 74,600 $3,673
NAVY 158,518 $7,802
AIR FORCE 60,078 $3,725
MARINE CORPS 38,190 $1,414
TOTAL 331,386 $16,614
*Total includes military and civilian support personnel.
**Dollars in U.S. millions.
Source : United States General Accounting Office, Report to
Congressional Requesters , "Military Presence: U.S. Personnel
in the Pacific Theater," U.S. GAO, August 1991.
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provided South Korea the opportunity to achieve economic
independence while Northeast Asian security was maintained
primarily by the presence of U.S. forces. With the primary
justification for this presence (North Korea) in the process
of decline, that presence itself can now be reevaluated, as
indeed it has been in the three phase drawdown proposed by
Secretary of Defense Cheney in the "Strategic Framework."
This type of long term role as guardian of foreign
security interests may be relinquished in the future. While
the army served this purpose particularly well, it is clear
that within this largely maritime and insular region, the
employment of naval forces in the future will prove to be the
most advisable type of military force.
In terms of a new approach to force posture and
employment, the mobility of naval forces, including the USMC,
will continue to serve not only strategic benefit but also
function to lower the overall cost of a new posture insofar as
naval forces can be quickly adapted to respond with force to
any area within the Asian region.
The range of options for future military presence in the
region will nonetheless include all arms of the military, with
modifications based primarily on budget constraints and
perceived regional threats. What remains consistent
throughout most analyses is the critical role that the navy
will play in the future. The following force posture
proposals have been gleaned from a recent Rand Corporation
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report which outlines a variety of options for future military
presence in Asia. It provides an excellent framework within
which to discuss the issue of defense drawdowns and their
effect on U.S. military forces in the region. While this list
cannot be considered entirely inclusive, it does address the
scope of options from complete engagement to the virtual
elimination of forces in Asia.
The posture outlines are as follows 193 :
A) Cold War force - this level is self-explanatory and,
of course entirely unreasonable in light of domestic budget
constraints and actual strategic requirements. It is
presented primarily for comparison purposes.
B) The Base Force - This level assumes a 15% drawdown
in the region (as compared to level A), and indeed functions
as the structure being currently pursued by the Bush
Administration within Phase I of the Strategic Framework.
C) Reduced Base Access Force - This posture assumes a
drastic retrenchment of U.S. forces in terms of withdrawal
from all U.S. bases in Asia. Force size is similar to level
B, but all U.S. forces have been relocated to either Hawaii,
Guam, or Alaska. The authors consider this posture, while not
the most austere of options, by far the most dangerous and
destabilizing, stating in part that "...such a drastic change
193
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would likely produce a range of negative military and
political responses throughout Northeast Asia. 194 "
D) Pacific Swing Force - Force level is similar to B
and C, but the forces are available to CINCCENT for use in
support of crises in the Persian Gulf. While responding to
these crises, all maritime and military exercises as well as
port visits in the Pacific will be eliminated, as the majority
of forces will be outside of the region.
E) Lower Budget Force - This level assumes a 35%
decrease from level A, and calls for severe cuts to all
aspects of the U.S. military presence. While base privileges
will be maintained, they will be only used sporadically by a
greatly reduced and less visible force.
F) Lower Budget Swing Force - This last level is a
combination of D and E, and provides the least amount of
forward presence over time and will have its greatest effect
on ground and air forces in Asia, these forces being all but
eliminated.
The present regional naval buildup as examined in this
thesis combined with the regional apprehension that is both
fueling and being fueled by this buildup provides the most
imminent threat to the mid to long-term security of the U.S.
in the Asia-Pacific region. A continued American military
presence is clearly going to be maintained in the region, and
194
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it can undoubtedly be scaled back to meet the 35% goal set by
some, while at the same time providing protection for vital
economic markets in the region.
Meeting this goal will require the eventual removal of all
forces in Korea and a significant scaling back of both naval
and other forces from Japan, somewhat in line with posture C.
As mentioned in Chapter III, it will be critical to remain
actively engaged in terms of Japanese defense for the benefit
of all players in the region. Removal of all U.S. ground
forces in Asia, while eventually desirable, would not be
prudent in the case of Japan until a stable regional power
structure has evolved and been in place for some time.
As the analysis of this thesis implies, it would be unwise
for the U.S. military in Asia to perform a kind of double duty
in Asia by functioning as a "swing force." While in actual
situations such forces could certainly be called upon to
assist in other areas of the world as crises require, it would
send the wrong signal to Asia if the United States were to
plan as a primary mission for Asian forces an explicitly non-
Asian role. This would reinforce Asian views that the United
States cares less for Asia and Asians than other people and
parts of the world.
In line with pursuing a target of 35% reduction in U.S.
military troops in Asia, and the prudent scaling back of
permanent American ground forces, a combination of posture C
(Reduced Base Access) and posture E (Lower Budget Force) would
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best meet U.S. goals. A careful blending of these two
approaches would meet the future requirements for United
States security needs in Asia.
By positioning the U.S. Navy as the primary force in terms
of Asian presence, the United States reserves the right to act
unilaterally while at the same time fostering goodwill and
friendship building with the mobility and inherent visibility
of these naval forces. Because naval forces are so mobile,
less of them are required to fulfill the visibility and
presence function that stands as the primary objective for
U.S. forces in Asia in the future. It must be clear to all
the nations of Asia that the United States cares about its
interests in Asia and that the U.S. Navy is prepared to
protect those interests unilaterally or in conjunction with a
coalition of Asian partners.
Cooperation and coalitions can and should be encouraged
with the United States taking the lead in such measures.
These types of operations, as mentioned above, should take the
form of non-binding and_ short-term joint maritime maneuvers
and training. These examples of innovative thinking in terms
of maintaining long held friendships and forming new
relationships will prove helpful in maintaining the level of
regional security required for U.S. economic interests to




As Charles Krauthammer noted above, the stability that the
United States will require in the future interdependent world
will have to be maintained by the U.S. armed forces. While
burden-sharing and widespread base access will be examples of
new ways of employing and funding those forces, it remains the
case that U.S forces will and should be prepared to act
unilaterally to protect perceived threats to the domestic
well-being of American citizens and their interests.
In the future, that well-being could be threatened far
from American shores and could arise with little to no
warning. In this region, maintenance of a vigilant maritime
presence and the ability to project naval power ashore and at
sea on short notice provides the American people with a




Is the Pacific Ocean a new Mediterranean Sea already
binding its people together instead of separating them?
Do its restless currents forecast an enlightened, peaceful
tomorrow, or renascent hostility ominous for the future of
humankind? Will Americans continue to venture westward in
the bold spirit of earlier generations? To do so they
shall have to reassert the courage, foresight, and a sense
of purpose of their forebearers . Otherwise, future
historians may be compelled to record a waning of the
American epoch. l9 *
This thesis has examined the nature and scope of a new
naval arms buildup within the Asian region. Even more
important than the increase and modernization of the maritime
forces, a fundamental shift is underway in strategic thinking
that is forming the rationale for the types of vessels and
systems being acquired. Leading nations in the region are
shifting their military strengths toward fending off maritime
threats or preempting such a threat by occupation or invasion.
There is a widespread concern among the nations involved
in this study that the United States is on the threshold of
retrenching from its international commitments that have
served to define regional stability for forty-five years. In
response to this perception, these nations have unilaterally
assumed a greater burden for affecting the regional power
balance. None of these nations wants to see any of the others
19S Arthur Power Dudden, 271.
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gaining the regional upper hand. The maritime arms race, seen
in this context, functions as a vicious circle of arms
acquisition, and as such is inherently destabilizing.
The increase in regional tension and mistrust can be
witnessed in a variety of small scale conflicts that currently
threaten to spill over into violence. Each inter-regional
dispute if taken in solo poses no imminent threat to the newly
emerging security interest of the United States. It is the
pattern of apprehension, however, lying just below the surface
of regional relationships, now being fueled by the arms
buildup, that could completely disrupt this region, and as
such have profound effects upon the long term economic well-
being of the United States.
The varied and historically complex relationships between
all the nations of the region may mistakenly lead the United
States to a policy of letting these countries "sort out their
differences" now that the risk of U.S. -Soviet confrontation
has been removed. This short term perspective could prove
catastrophic for the future of U.S. economic and political
prosperity
.
China, Japan, and India have begun in earnest the struggle
for regional domination in Asia. Their respective naval
forces are showing signs of growth and technological
evolution. These countries can all be considered regional
powers aspiring to regional dominance and worldwide
recognition. Regional tensions and ethnic animosities within
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and among these and the other nations of Asia will stand as
the primary obstacle to any one nation gaining the decisive
upper hand in terms of military power.
While the outcome of this Asian security restructuring is
unclear, the United States can clearly not afford to stand
idly by, or worse, watch from a distant American shore, while
this restructuring takes place. A continued, albeit
reconsidered U.S. military presence is required to maintain a
viable and effective voice in Asian affairs for an
economically interdependent America.
There are costs to maintaining a vibrant and globally
competitive American economy in the post-Cold War era. These
costs are relatively high, but not beyond America's
capability. They do involve a commitment to maintaining
military forces commensurate with American worldwide
interests. The U.S. Navy poses the most cost effective means
of providing that military presence in Asia. The Navy
provides a permanent lever by which the U.S. can control or
influence events and decisions in Asia that directly effect
the American citizen.
The U.S. Navy is also an excellent bargaining tool for the
future. The nations of Asia clearly desire such a naval
presence by the United States. It should be made clear to
these nations that they must pay an economic quid pro quo for
the benefits of stability that they receive from American
naval presence. Their navies are not capable of providing
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this type of security, and in the future the United States
should not willingly provide it unless favorable economic
terms can be gained in areas that can benefit the United
States, for example in much more open markets for American
food and services. Thus economic benefits can be derived,
however subtly, from the presence of U.S. naval forces in Asia
and at the same time those forces can provide the most
economical protection for the valuable and long held American
interests in the region.
It is essential that the United States come to a distinct
definition of the future for U.S. national interests. These
interests will have at their core U.S. economic concerns
around the world. There can be no more important region in
the world than Asia in terms of U.S. economic investments and
involvement. Protecting, enhancing and insuring the
conservation of those interests should remain a top priority
for U.S. defense planners.
Finally, above all else, it is critical for the United
States to explicitly define its worldwide interests and the
attendant effects that the current reassessment will have on
the conduct of both foreign affairs and military employment
around the world. In this light, taking all the uncertainty
and regional mistrust being displayed within Asia, the
maintenance of a strong and visible maritime force will
provide U.S. leaders and Asian allies with the most expedient
and effective means of providing needed stability and
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